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 This thesis analyzes the importance of piracy to the beginnings of English overseas 
expansion.  This study will consider the piratical climate around the British Isles in the sixteenth 
century, and the ways in which this context affected the participants in the first English colonial 
projects.  Piracy became inseparably associated with nearly all of the Elizabethan overseas 
expeditions, contributing experienced seamen to the cause and promising to fill gaps in the 
financial strength of the expeditions.  Ultimately, piracy proved difficult to control, and 
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Chapter One: An Introduction to Pirates and Colonies 
Historians have long referred to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as the 
“Golden Age of Piracy,” known for its host of swashbuckling characters as grounded in fiction 
as in fact, but the sixteenth century in England represented its own golden age for those rovers 
and pirates looking to make quick profits by spoiling the growing volume of international trade 
passing through the littoral waters of Europe.  These predations were often committed under 
legal authorization from the English Crown through letters of reprisal or letters of marque.  In 
both cases, Englishmen were unleashed upon the shipping of rival nations to commit tolerated 
piracy under certain limitations of time and scope.  These ships were not part of the Royal Navy 
proper; rather, this process of private warfare, often called privateering, helped swell English sea 
power through the enlistment of private men willing to risk their lives for the sake of their 
country and for the hope of taking a heavily-laden prize ship. 
The participants in these acts of reprisal do not fit the stereotypical image of swaggering 
corsairs often depicted in popular media.  These creations of twentieth century cinema do a 
disservice to the truth of eighteenth-century pirates typically shown on silver screens and form an 
even greater misrepresentation of the Elizabethan pirates.  The majority of these “sea-dogs,” as 
they are frequently called, began their careers, and often remained, simply merchants.  The 
emerging English merchant class possessed the means to purchase and outfit ships for the 
dangerous business of piracy on the high seas, and while commissions for reprisals were issued 
for the ships and cargoes of specific nations, the large number of outstanding reprisals 
throughout the middle and latter decades of the sixteenth century created an environment of 
frequent and often indiscriminate piracy that threatened to drag England into conflict with its 
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Continental neighbors throughout the period.  These merchant-pirates received support from 
prominent gentlemen hoping to profit from this favorable environment for quick profits.1 
These merchant-pirates and their gentlemen supporters became the central players in the 
beginnings of English overseas expansion during the latter decades of the sixteenth century.  
Many of the perpetrators of these ambiguous acts of piracy within English territorial waters were 
integral participants in the first phase of English expansion beyond the confines of their 
immediate European surroundings.  Even before England began its involvement in North 
America – a popular but inaccurate marker for the beginnings of English overseas expansion – 
English merchants were connecting with new markets throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa.  
Men like William and John Hawkins, Martin Frobisher, and Francis Drake began their notable 
careers in these trades.  Invariably, these expeditions abroad involved the same piratical activity 
plaguing English waters at home.  The Hawkins family created its fame by raiding Portuguese 
slavers on the African coast, Martin Frobisher began his long maritime career illegally trading 
for pepper on the Guinea Coast, and Francis Drake’s first overseas experience came alongside 
his cousin, John Hawkins, in illegally trading slaves in Spanish America.  It was no glorious 
beginning of English overseas empire, but a beginning nonetheless.2 
In the 1560s and 1570s, Englishmen began to take serious interest in the prospect of 
planting colonies of Englishmen abroad.  The first English colonies were not planted in America, 
but rather in nearby Ireland.  The island had been nominally conquered by the Normans after 
their eleventh century conquest, but under the Tudor monarchs, England looked to expand its 
                                                      
1 Mark Hanna, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire: 1570-1740 (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 3-4. 
2 Harry Kelsey, Sir John Hawkins: Queen Elizabeth’s Slave Trader (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003); James McDermott, Martin Frobisher: Elizabethan Privateer (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2001); Harry Kelsey, Sir Francis Drake: The Queen’s Pirate (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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realm of real control beyond the meager pale of settlement immediately outside Dublin into the 
entirety of the island.  The English attempted to achieve this goal through “plantations,” literal 
plantings of English communities in strategic areas of Ireland.  Plantations developed in Munster 
and Cork during the Elizabethan period, but this first experience of colonization was exceedingly 
bloody and unsuccessful.  The native Irish had no interest in being ruled by English invaders 
who considered their ancient culture as a barbarous manifestation of their primitive practices 
melded with a firm resistance to abandoning their Catholic faith.  The English relied on military 
conquerors to subdue the native Irish and elicited Roman precedents of conquest from colonial 
theorists.  Thomas Smith, an intellectual and previous Principal Secretary of the Privy Council, 
reveled in the process of civilizing the Irish.  In Smith’s mind, English culture would benefit the 
wild Irish just as Roman law and culture had benefited the once wild progenitors of the English 
nation.  In the end, little civilization came to Ireland as indiscriminate slaughter came to typify 
English involvement in Ireland during the Tudor period.  Important precedents from the Irish 
experience carried into the American colonization movement, and in the seventeenth century, 
English experiences in Virginia changed the colonial program in Ireland.3     
The English began their American efforts in a sphere already exploited by the Spanish for 
over half a century and in lands claimed by the Spanish monarch as an extension of the authority 
of the pope.  The beginnings of English colonization cannot be separated from the monumental 
religious upheaval of the Protestant Reformation.  Luther’s intellectual contagion spread rapidly 
throughout continental Europe in the early decades of the sixteenth century, spurring competition 
among Protestant and Catholic confessional states.  Eventually England joined the Protestant 
                                                      
3 Nicholas P. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-1576 (New York, 
NY: Harper & Row, 1976); Mary Dewar, Sir Thomas Smith: A Tudor Intellectual in Office (London, UK: The 
Athlone Press, 1964). 
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cause after Henry VIII’s self-serving departure from papal authority in the 1530s.  The English 
Reformation proceeded in fits and starts throughout the century, but England’s commitment to 
Protestantism was largely assured under Queen Elizabeth I.  Her reign witnessed the beginnings 
of English expansion around the world and confrontation between England and the Catholic 
powers of the continent.4  
Humphrey Gilbert and his half-brother, Walter Ralegh5, received colonial patents from 
Queen Elizabeth I and point directly toward the beginnings of an English-speaking America; 
nevertheless, the recurring theme of Gilbert and Ralegh’s colonial efforts – indeed of the English 
effort generally – is failure.  England failed miserably in its quest to secure permanent, self-
sustaining settlements overseas during the sixteenth century.  Compared to the remarkable 
success of their Spanish rivals in securing massive amounts of land and native laborers to extract 
resources bound for the Spanish coffers, the English effort is shown to have been even more 
disappointing.  Despite their unique qualities, these ventures are inseparable from the climate of 
piracy so pervasive in English maritime culture at the time, a fact that needs further clarity in the 
historiography of the early English Atlantic World.  The first English overseas efforts were a 
diverse collection of ventures not bearing many commonalities on the surface.  Slave raiding and 
trading, a circumnavigation voyage, Arctic gold-mining operations, expeditions bent on the 
conquest of Spanish America, and neo-feudal manorial colonies form a cross-section of those 
expeditions actually attempted in the early years.  This thesis argues that piracy represented the 
clearest strand of commonality that bound together the various English overseas expeditions in 
                                                      
4 Carla Gardina Pestana, Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 33-43. 
5 Sir Walter’s last name was spelled no less than 70 different ways during his lifetime; nonetheless, this 
spelling of his last name is most commonly used in the academic literature since he most frequently signed himself 
this way. For a good discussion of the issue, and an example in contrast to the one employed here, see Raleigh 
Trevelyan, Sir Walter Raleigh (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), xiv. 
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its earliest stage, corresponding roughly to the years between 1550 and 1600.  Furthermore, by 
the end of the sixteenth century, piracy had clearly done considerable harm to the colonial 
enterprise.  
The climate of tolerated maritime violence in the emerging English Atlantic World was 
pervasive.  Thus, Humphrey Gilbert, a military man not particularly representative of the many 
merchant-pirates spoiling countless vessels in the English Channel, asked the queen for the first 
English colonial patent merely as a cover for a massive piratical raid on the Spanish Empire in 
the West Indies.  This expedition failed from the disorganization that should have been expected 
from the culmination of such a brash plan.  As Gilbert embraced his colonial patent for its own 
sake, he composed grandiose visions for a feudal society in North America, yet ambitions of 
piracy persisted.  Rather than securing the necessary supplies for his colony in 1583, Gilbert 
plundered the peaceful community of international fishermen working along the shore of 
Newfoundland.  For Gilbert, no amount of plundered provisions could sustain his enterprise 
against successive strokes of bad luck, culminating in his unfortunate death on the way home to 
England.6 
Piracy touched each of the early English voyages often as a matter of practicality, as 
much as a product of human greed among its promoters and participants.  English colonial 
ventures proved very difficult to finance in the sixteenth century and beyond, especially because 
no English settlements had shown an ability to make a profit for themselves.  To English eyes, 
even Spanish colonies did not advocate for the profitability of colonies apart from the 
extraordinary wealth of the Native American empires they conquered and the rich silver mines 
they exploited in Peru.  Martin Frobisher’s debacle in the Northwest pursuing mineral extraction 
                                                      
6 David Beers Quinn, ed., The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 2 vols. 
(London, UK: The Hakluyt Society, 1940). 
 
 6 
did particularly serious damage to future colonial expeditions.  Queen Elizabeth believed 
Frobisher’s bold scheme to be one capable of enriching her realm, but her financial support was 
sorely wasted in mining worthless ore.  The queen never committed serious resources to any 
venture unproven to bring immediate profits; thus, Gilbert and Ralegh enjoyed precious little 
financial support from the queen in their colonial ventures.  However, the queen did fund purely 
piratical enterprises and voyages concerned solely with trade with considerable generosity.  
Drake’s West Indies raid of 1586 owed about one third of its capital to the queen’s investment, 
and the queen also supported Edward Fenton’s voyage meant to build a trading relationship with 
the Moluccas.  Acts of piracy often filled a gap in colonial promoters’ abilities to raise the funds 
necessary to carry their plans overseas, and in several ventures, piratical loot probably covered 
all expenses of their associated expeditions.  In the end, this exerted a deleterious influence on 
the outcomes of those colonial expeditions associated with piracy by resting the prospects of 
success on notoriously unreliable characters.  
Ralegh embraced his deceased brother’s colonial ambitions, modifying them for 
changing times in 1584 as open war with Spain seemed increasingly likely.  In his Roanoke 
colonies, powerful economic and ideological motivations coalesced into a unified strategy to 
grow rich by plundering Spanish heretics.  Ralegh’s military expedition in 1585 aimed to 
establish a military outpost suitable for hiding patriotic pirates who would plunder the Spanish 
treasure fleet as it made its vulnerable run up the Gulf Stream along the coast of North America.  
Their hopes for quick profits blinded them to Roanoke Island’s inability to host deep-draft 
vessels because of its treacherous inlet approaches, and a history of Irish violence among the 
colony’s leadership led to bloody conflict with their Native American hosts.  Ralegh’s 1585 
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colony at Roanoke represented a natural and quintessential culmination of English overseas 
activity in the sixteenth century.  
Despite the first Roanoke colony’s failure and departure in 1586, some of Ralegh’s wise 
decisions made it a valuable learning experience in many ways.  John White and Thomas Hariot 
returned to England with an impressive visual and scientific testament to the potential of eastern 
North America for English settlements.  By 1587, Ralegh had learned many of the lessons his 
brother had learned the hard way; he sent a colony based on incentives of land ownership that 
would be largely self-governing.  Ralegh’s second colony bore all the characteristics of 
successful English colonial ventures in the next century, yet the attraction of piracy in the 
increasingly violent sea war undercut his colony in multiple ways and relegated his Lost 
Colonists to a fate lost to history. 
Too frequently, these early ventures of English expansion are relegated to a place of 
insignificance in major considerations of American colonial history.  In The British Atlantic 
World, 1500-1800 – a showcase of the leading proponents of Atlantic history –Roanoke is 
named once, and then only in a list of English colonial “debacles.”7  Even Anthony Pagden, an 
esteemed historian of European imperialism, only mentions Roanoke by name once in a book 
dedicated to comparing ideologies of empire, and only then in an absurdly mistaken reference to 
John Smith as the “Governor of the Roanoke Colony from 1608-1609.”8  While some historians 
focused closely on Ralegh’s colonies in the middle and latter decades of the twentieth century, 
                                                      
7 Alison Games, “Migrations” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. David Armitage and Michael 
J. Braddick (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 39. 
8 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, c. 1500 – c. 
1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 36. 
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most recent works give limited attention to them, or examine them solely for the purpose of 
finding new clues relating to the “Lost Colony” of popular lore.9   
The actual purposes of the Roanoke colonies demand more careful attention than recent 
historians have given them.  With no consideration of the obvious evolution of Ralegh’s colonial 
plans during this time and the diversity of ventures that preceded and informed their conception, 
the Roanoke ventures appear to be inconsequential and rashly conceived.  In contrast to the bevy 
of works produced in recent years seeking to ascertain the fate of the Lost Colonists, the 
Roanoke ventures should be viewed as a culmination of English attempts to entrench themselves 
overseas and a testament to Sir Walter Ralegh’s ability to adjust his plans to make success more 
likely.  Ultimately Ralegh’s scheme never realized its potential to become the beginnings of a 
permanent English presence in North America.  Piracy undercut Ralegh’s best laid plans and 
belongs at the fore of any discussion of the beginnings of the English experience in America. 
In viewing the beginnings of the English colonial movement through a lens of piracy, a 
host of characters little-known outside of field specialists become more important players in the 
colonial movement.  Simão Fernandes, an Azorean pilot who served Spain for several years, is 
exemplary of such characters at the convergence point between pirates and colonizers.  
Fernandes also participated in a piracy of knowledge taking place in the growing rivalry between 
powers in the Atlantic World.  His invaluable charts and shared knowledge of Portuguese and 
Spanish practices threatened as much harm to Iberian dominance of the Americas as any prize 
ship taken during the period.  John Callis, perhaps the most notorious English pirate of the 
                                                      
9 David Beers Quinn, Kenneth R. Andrews, and Karen Kupperman wrote excellent books on Roanoke that 
will discussed later in the chapter. Among the recent works centering on the Lost Colony are: Andrew Lawler, The 
Secret Token: Myth, Obsession, and the Search for the Lost Colony of Roanoke (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2018); 
James Horn, A Kingdom Strange: The Brief and Tragic History of the Lost Colony of Roanoke (New York, NY: 




1570s, also illustrates the line between those pirates considered a nuisance worthy of the gallows 
and those with value to the state.  These two men and others grow large in importance as piracy 
is given its proper place of historical importance in the late sixteenth century.      
Many historians have followed convention by calling the English pirates of the sixteenth 
century, “privateers.”10  This term is problematic for several reasons.  First, the term “privateer” 
is anachronistic to the period, emerging in the seventeenth century to describe explicitly state-
sanctioned piracy against the enemies of the state.  These seamen carried letters of marque or 
letters of reprisal from the Crown, legalizing their actions and giving them a place in the 
enterprises typically reserved for England’s small Royal Navy.  Second, it is not clear that many 
– indeed the vast majority – held such legal documentation to legitimize their predatory cruises.  
Many sailors claimed to have letters when convenient but were rarely able to provide one when 
pressed.  Furthermore, many of those “privateers” that did possess letters of marque received 
them from leaders of questionable authority.  Dom Antonio, the pretender to the Portuguese 
throne after it was taken by the Spanish in 1580, enlisted such help in many occasions.11  
Ultimately, the identity of these maritime warriors is one of perspective; the Spanish 
unquestioningly called them “corsarios,” sixteenth century Englishmen called them 
“merchants,” twentieth-century historians called them “privateers,” and recent historians seem 
divided between “pirates” and “privateers.”  On the surface, “privateers” is unsatisfactory as an 
anachronism, yet it retains some utility in describing the few ventures that can comfortably be 
described as state-sanctioned enterprises.  Precision is to be preferred over ambiguity, and the 
term used should always be a purposeful, intentional choice.  
                                                      
10 Among those who used the term despite some concern over its precision are Kenneth Andrews, James 
McDermott, and David Beers Quinn. 
11 For example, Edward Fenner and the notorious John Callice operated under Dom Antonio’s questionable 
authority in 1585. Calendar of State Papers (CSP), Domestic, Elizabeth, 1581-1590, 233.  
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Histories written within an Atlantic World framework have proliferated in recent years 
and contribute useful perspectives for understanding the emergence of England as a participant 
in an increasingly connected Atlantic World.  In truth, many of the most important Early 
Americanists and English colonial scholars of the twentieth century were writing “Atlantic 
history” before it possessed a discrete identity as a field of history and long before it became one 
of the dominant paradigms in the historical discipline.  David Beers Quinn and Kenneth R. 
Andrews considered developments throughout the Atlantic in their pursuit of understanding the 
beginnings of English expansion, but the expansion in academic literature situated within a 
framework of Atlantic History suggest the fruitfulness of a reexamination of the topic, especially 
considering the dearth of recent scholarly work on many of the early English enterprises.  
 The early historiography of English piracy is quite Anglo-centric, produced during a time 
of British hegemony around the world and by men directly associated with the contemporary 
Royal Navy.  Men like Sir Julian Corbett and Michael Oppenheim often lauded the 
accomplishments of the sea dogs and expounded the now-challenged, if still widely accepted, 
view of Drake as a Protestant hero.12  These works exaggerated the noble motivations of the 
piratical participants in these early ventures, and revisionists challenged their overarching 
assertions about the respectability of England’s Elizabethan heroes in the middle of the twentieth 
century.  Nevertheless, these early works remain generally useful studies of the English pirates, 
and the major narrative of their importance in the sixteenth century remains largely unchanged.  
The most important of these early works is Drake and the Tudor Navy, with the Rise of England 
as a Naval Power [1899] by Corbett, complemented by his influential primary source collection, 
                                                      
12 Julian S. Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, with the Rise of England as a Naval Power, 2nd ed., vol. 1-
2 (London, UK: Navy Records Society, 1899); Michael Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal 
Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy from 1509 to 1660 with an Introduction Treating of the 
Preceding Period (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing, 1988). 
 
 11 
Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish War, 1585-1587 [1898].13  It is also worth 
remembering that a desire to formulate modern naval strategy informed most of Corbett’s many 
works, with historical study bearing relevance only so far as it cast light on the strategic 
imperatives of the Royal Navy around 1900. 
Kenneth R. Andrews surpassed Corbett’s importance in the historiography of English 
privateering during the Anglo-Spanish War with his excellent research into the peculiar issue of 
private warfare at sea and the beginnings of English maritime expansion, especially in the 
Caribbean.14  Andrews’s PhD thesis was later expanded into his most important book, 
Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Spanish War, 1585-1603 [1964].15  
Published over half a century after Corbett’s career in the field ended, Elizabethan Privateering 
first challenged many of his prior conclusions.  Using an inordinate supply of previously under-
considered primary sources from the High Court of the Admiralty in England, Andrews dispelled 
the myth that the Anglo-Spanish War was waged at sea by a group of landed, amateur, God-
fearing, gentlemen privateers.  In contrast, the highly-efficient “Great Merchants” pooled their 
resources to dispatch ships and a host of professional mariners to trade and plunder the wealth of 
the Spanish Empire.16  The privateering environment of the Anglo-Spanish War was not unique, 
however, and earlier periods of widespread reprisal activity in the middle of the sixteenth century 
deserve the same level of close examination that Andrews provided in Elizabethan Privateering.   
Later in his career, Andrews wrote Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise 
and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 [1984], the finest synthesis to date of the 
                                                      
13 Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy; Julian S. Corbett, Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish 
War, 1585-1587 (London, UK: Navy Records Society, 1898. 
14 Kenneth R. Andrews, The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder 1530-1630 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1978). 
15 Kenneth R. Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering during the Sea War, 1585-1603 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1964). 
16 Ibid., 118-123. 
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available literature on the topic of early English overseas expansion.17  Andrews argues that the 
seeds of the future British Empire were sown in the unprecedented maritime expansion of the 
island nation from 1480 to 1630.  Trade, Plunder, and Settlement carefully considers the 
economic factors that drove English merchants traditionally concerned primarily with selling 
their cloth wares throughout Europe to pursue new markets from Muscovy and Persia to the far 
reaches of the Atlantic Rim.  These traders often engaged in acts of piracy to make their trading 
expeditions more profitable. This in turn drew the English into conflict with their continental 
rivals, namely Spain.  Early English colonies struggled to find funding due to the state’s general 
ambivalence and reluctance to commit resources to anything without strong guarantees of 
immediate profit.  As a result, the first colonies struggled mightily to secure their place in the 
New World.    
Of the existing secondary literature, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement most closely reflects 
the argument of this thesis; nevertheless, the two pieces will differ in some important ways.  
First, Andrews’s extensive time period and his attempt to consider nearly all consequential 
aspects of his topic make it, by necessity, a broad work primarily interested in synthesizing the 
most important secondary literature produced by a bevy of scholars, including Andrews himself, 
in the twentieth century.  Given the importance of the piracy context in the first attempts at 
permanent English settlement in the New World, these developments need to be grounded more 
closely in primary sources.  Second, Andrews’s research focuses on the economic motivations 
for English empire to the neglect of equally powerful ideological motives that drove many of the 
participants forward.  While this was probably a reaction to previous historians like Corbett who 
often ascribed overly idealistic, proto-nationalistic motives to these progenitors of empire, 
                                                      
17 Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the 
British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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Andrews’s correction goes a bit too far.  In his preface, arguing that he had no political motives 
in writing the book, Andrews claimed that he “ceased to subscribe to any sort of marxism [sic] 
nearly twenty years ago,” but his arguments tend toward economic determinism.18  
In opposition to Andrews’s argument for the primacy of commercial issues in the rise of 
the British Empire, Andrew Fitzmaurice argues that humanistic impulses born out of the 
Renaissance were the primary drivers of the early English ventures in Humanism and America: 
An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625 [2003].19  Fitzmaurice’s intellectual 
history is an excellent addition to the topic and helpfully complicates traditional views that 
ascribe overly nationalistic or greedy motivations to the colonial promoters.  Fitzmaurice strays 
in isolating colonial ventures from the many commercial ventures that preceded and ran 
contemporarily with the first efforts to plant sustainable colonies of Englishmen.  By necessity 
for his argument, his work does not consider Drake, Frobisher, or Hawkins to be key players in 
early English colonial history.  Both Andrews and Fitzmaurice contribute valuable perspectives, 
and future studies should borrow liberally from their frameworks; however, Andrews’s model 
predicated on economic incentives and Fitzmaurice’s model based in ideological developments 
should be synthesized to produce a more accurate picture of early English colonization.   
Mark Hanna’s Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire: 1570-1740 [2015] is one 
of the finest works on English piracy written in the twenty-first century.20  Hanna primarily 
focuses on the role of communities on land – “pirate nests” – in supporting acts of piracy 
committed at sea.  Only the first chapter, “The Elizabethan West Country: Nursery for English 
                                                      
18 Ibid.,viii. 
19 Andrew Fitzmaurice, Humanism in America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
20 Mark Hanna, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire: 1570-1740 (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015). 
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Seamen… And Pirates, 1570-1603,” relates directly to the time period considered in this thesis, 
but his overall emphasis on the importance of piracy to the beginnings of the British Empire is 
certainly germane to the entirety of this study.21  Hanna considers the West Country of England 
to be the earliest significant pirate nest in protecting rogue mariners during the earliest stages of 
English overseas expansion.  While his consideration of English piracy and the futility of the 
Admiralty’s efforts to suppress it in the late sixteenth century is excellent, he mentions Sir 
Humphrey Gilbert’s and Sir Walter Ralegh’s colonial enterprises only in passing, presumably for 
their impermanence; nevertheless, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire bears striking 
witness to the attractions of piracy that persisted long after the Elizabethan period.  Pirates would 
find safe havens in English colonies around the world until the early years of the eighteenth 
century when a dedicated effort to suppress the practice succeeded in suppressing unregulated 
violence at sea.  Hanna’s book is generally excellent in the conclusions it draws from extensive 
primary and secondary source reading, but the Elizabethan period represents a high-water mark 
in the level of state-sanction that piracy enjoyed and in the overt support that pirates lent to the 
English colonial mission.   
John C. Appleby’s Under the Bloody Flag: Pirates of the Tudor Age [2009] is the most 
detailed history of Tudor piracy ever written and a useful complement to Hanna’s Pirate Nests.22  
As its title suggests, Appleby’s primary interest is in the individual pirates that typified English 
piracy during the period.  Using the records of England’s Privy Council, Appleby exhaustively 
covers English piracy’s evolution from the fifteenth century into the beginning of the 
seventeenth century.  Under the Bloody Flag brings many of the most active pirates into sharp 
                                                      
21 Ibid., 21-57. 




detail and presents substantiating evidence for the general characterizations of piracy made in 
previous works.  Appleby considers piracy’s role in English overseas expansion, but most of his 
research is limited to the expeditions of Drake and Fenton that solely focused on plunder.  His 
limited coverage of the colonial expeditions of Gilbert and Ralegh reduces its contribution to the 
Elizabethan colonial literature, but the work remains an excellent assessment of the piratical 
climate that so profoundly affected contemporary colonial developments.   
Several of the Elizabethan pirates have been the subjects of major biographies and 
reappraisals in the past century.  James Williamson, John Hawkins’s most prolific biographer, 
wrote the first major biography of the Plymouth merchant-pirate in 1927 and followed it with 
another in 1949.23  Williamson considered Hawkins to be a key figure in the development of 
modern English nationalism and, by extension, the culture of English piracy that Hawkins 
represented.  His biography is sparsely cited, limiting its use for modern historians.  In 2003, 
Harry Kelsey reexamined Hawkins’s life in Sir John Hawkins: Queen Elizabeth’s Slave Trader 
[2003].24  Kelsey’s book challenges some of Williamson’s previous assumptions about Hawkins, 
particularly Williamson’s firm belief that Hawkins was a dedicated believer in English 
Protestantism.  Kelsey’s biography is carefully sourced with much Spanish material relating to 
Hawkins’s trading expeditions to Africa and Spanish America in the 1560s.  Using these 
documents neglected by Williamson, Kelsey’s account paints a fuller picture of the complicated 
man. 
                                                      
23 James A. Williamson, Sir John Hawkins, the Time and the Man (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 
1927); James A. Williamson, Hawkins of Plymouth: A New History of Sir John Hawkins and of the Other Members 
of his Family Prominent in Tudor England (London, UK: Adam and Charles Black, 1949). 




James McDermott’s excellent biography of Martin Frobisher highlights the wonderful 
insights to be learned from the careful study of frequently neglected individuals in the historical 
past.25  Frobisher attracted little attention in the centuries following his death, primarily due to 
the embarrassment caused to his queen by his ill-fated voyages in search of the Northwest 
Passage and Arctic gold.  In Martin Frobisher: Elizabethan Privateer [2001], McDermott 
follows all scraps of evidence pointing to the character and exploits of the most frequently 
forgotten English sea-dog.  His exhaustive research into Frobisher’s life and times is as valuable 
for its incisive picture of the context of Elizabethan England as it is for its thorough assessment 
of its title character.  In this way, his book is one of the most useful for understanding the culture 
of piracy flourishing around the British Isles and throughout the developing English Atlantic 
World.   
Hawkins’s second cousin, Francis Drake, has probably inspired as many biographical 
treatments as any Englishman, but only a few stand as major contributions to knowledge of the 
quintessential Elizabethan pirate.  Julian S. Corbett’s Drake and the Tudor Navy remains one of 
the most important works on Drake.  Even though its emphasis on the sea-dog’s nationalistic 
motivations shifted out of mainstream academic opinion during the twentieth century, much of 
Drake’s story is well-told in Corbett’s esteemed two-volume treatment.  Kenneth Andrews’s first 
published book, Drake’s Voyages [1970], reinterpreted Drake in light of Andrews’s immersion 
in the primary source material relating to his many voyages.26  Drake emerges from Andrews’s 
books as a great deal more self-interested than he does in Corbett’s earlier work, but he remains 
an ardent defender of the English overseas enterprise nonetheless.  In Harry Kelsey’s excellent 
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biography from 1998, Sir Francis Drake: The Queen’s Pirate, Drake is portrayed in a largely 
negative light, as a man not to be trusted.27  In more recent years, Wade Dudley’s moving 
biography, Drake: For God, Queen, and Plunder [2003], helps redeem the image of Drake 
promulgated in Kelsey’s book, highlighting the mixed motivations of the most-feared man in the 
Spanish mind during the latter decades of the sixteenth century.28     
While detailed studies of Elizabethan piracy and its primary participants have proliferated 
in recent years, equally important books on the English colonies founded during the period are 
quite dated.  Illustrating the trend, serious studies of Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s life are regretfully 
few, despite his large impact on the genesis of British overseas expansion.  William Gilbert 
Gosling’s 1911 book, The Life of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, England’s First Empire Builder, was 
Gilbert’s first widely accessible biography.29  Gosling’s study of Gilbert’s life was deep and 
systematic; he added considerable detail to Hakluyt’s sixteenth century accounts of Gilbert’s 
late-life colonial exploits.  The work reflects historiographical trends of the early twentieth 
century, especially in its consistent praise of “the genius of the (English) race,” and Gosling’s 
insistence that Gilbert’s atrocities in Ireland “must not… be attributed to any specially 
bloodthirsty proclivities on his part.”30 
Gosling’s boast in 1911 that he could “conscientiously confirm that every possible source 
of knowledge has been explored” was proven false by David Beers Quinn’s two volume work, 
The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert [1940].31  The work solidified 
Quinn’s scholarly ascendancy and signaled the beginning of his sixty-year tenure at the forefront 
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of English colonial studies.  Published in 1940, Quinn’s outstanding biographical introduction 
and large collection of relevant documents remains the preeminent piece of Gilbert scholarship 
today.  He reproduced the relevant sections from Hakluyt’s works and contributed a massive 
collection of previously unpublished letters, depositions, and notes on colonization.  Using these 
sources, Quinn composed a concise Gilbert biography as an introduction to the volumes that 
remains the finest biographical sketch to date.   
Quinn’s two volumes were nicely supplemented in 1972 with the publication of The New 
Found Land of Stephen Parmenius: The Life and Writings of a Hungarian Poet, Drowned on a 
Voyage from Newfoundland, 1583.32  Parmenius accompanied Gilbert on his final voyage to 
America with plans to compose an epic poem describing the first English colony in America.  
Thirty years after his original work on Gilbert, Quinn worked alongside Neil M. Cheshire, a 
literary scholar, to publish Parmenius’s surviving writings.  The Parmenius volume also included 
recently discovered correspondence to and from Maurice Browne, Captain of the Swallow and 
later the Delight in Gilbert’s 1583 expedition.  The Browne correspondence, located in the 
private papers of the Marquess of Bath, adds considerable detail to the preparations of the 1583 
voyage, which Quinn himself admitted were poorly understood in 1940.  More collections like 
Browne’s may exist in private holdings around the world, and dedicated scholars should continue 
to search for such valuable resources to advance scholarly knowledge of Gilbert’s ventures. 
Nathan Probasco’s recent PhD dissertation, “Researching North America: Sir Humphrey 
Gilbert’s 1583 Expedition and a Reexamination of Early Modern English Colonization in the 
North Atlantic World,” [2013] is the best scholarship relating to Gilbert’s colonial activities to 
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emerge in many years.33  Probasco emphasizes the extensive preparations made for Gilbert’s 
1583 voyage and cautions historians who tend to overlook the expedition “because no colony 
was established as a direct result of his efforts…..”34  Gilbert’s enterprises were sophisticated 
affairs, incorporating all the knowledge Englishmen had accumulated about North America 
through their own experiences and the experiences of other Continental nations.  
Irish colonization has been well-explored by several historians and remains an important 
area of interest for modern scholars.  Irish study has benefitted particularly from Atlantic World 
approaches in recent decades.  As in other areas, David Beers Quinn remains an influential voice 
in the field.  An Irishman himself, Quinn is credited with moving Irish history from amateurism 
into the mainstream of academic consideration in the British Isles and beyond.  The Elizabethans 
and the Irish [1966] is his most important study of the topic.35  He used many different sources 
in forming his assessment of English perceptions of the native Irish they encountered in their 
conquest; his use of visual material from the period, particularly popular caricatures, illustrates 
his leadership in employing modern, multi-disciplinary approaches in his research, an approach 
that served him best in his later work on the Roanoke voyages.   
Nicholas Canny, Quinn’s protégé, remains the most respected scholar of Irish history.  
His long career has expanded the profile of Irish history considerably.  His most important work 
is The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-1576 [1976].36  Canny 
argued that this crucial period determined the pattern of conquest that the English employed in 
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Ireland in succeeding generations.  Audrey Horning’s more recent book, Ireland in the Virginian 
Sea [2013], departs from Quinn’s and Canny’s general opinions that the Tudor conquest of 
Ireland had profound effects on the American efforts in succeeding years.37  Horning argues that 
the process of influence ran somewhat backwards from this as lessons learned in seventeenth 
century Virginia influenced the development of Irish colonies later in that century.  Both sides of 
this argument have some merit, but they are not necessarily self-contradictory.  Events on 
Roanoke Island in the 1580s bear the marks of the Irish precedent in American colonization, but 
lessons learned far from home undeniably made themselves felt in Ireland in the years following 
successful ventures to Virginia.  In this way, Ireland and America influenced each other through 
the give and take typical of many developments around the Atlantic Rim. 
Following the success of his work on Gilbert, David Beers Quinn applied a similar 
approach in editing his invaluable two volume Roanoke Voyages: 1584-1587.  Roanoke Voyages 
[1955] includes nearly two hundred documents from English and Spanish archives relating to 
Ralegh’s colonies.38  Quinn published many of these documents for the first time, and his 
thorough annotations throughout the collection make it particularly valuable.  Since its 
publication by the Hakluyt Society in 1955, Roanoke Voyages remains the focal point of 
documentary research into the colonies and the most important scholarly work in the 
historiography of the Roanoke colonies.  
Roanoke Voyages contains all the major narratives from the various English expeditions 
to the island during the sixteenth century.  These include Arthur Barlowe’s 1584 report, Ralph 
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Lane’s account of the 1585 colony, a description of Drake’s visit to Virginia in 1586, Thomas 
Harriot’s Briefe and True Report, and John White’s narratives of his various voyages.  While 
these accounts were previously published by Hakluyt, Quinn included annotations regarding 
outside knowledge to clarify these documents.  Quinn’s chief contribution in Roanoke Voyages is 
the large number of documents that bridge the gaps between these larger narrative sources.  
Quinn scoured archives around the United Kingdom and Continental Europe, finding useful 
sources that were neglected by previous historians.  These include a note written by the mayor of 
Plymouth about the number of Englishmen involved in the 1585 voyage, several letters written 
by Ralph Lane in 1585, some unique Danish information on the voyage, and documentation 
regarding Ralegh’s attempts to gather the supplies necessary for the transatlantic voyages.  These 
documents, accompanied by Quinn’s excellent annotations and narrative introductions to each 
section of the book, greatly expanded the readily available sources of the Roanoke voyages.  
These documents added clarity regarding the privateering enterprises in which the returning 
ships engaged, how Ralegh raised money for the colonies, and contemporary international 
reports on the English activities in America.   
In Roanoke Voyages, Quinn also included an important assessment of the existing 
watercolors of John White, a particularly valuable source in assessing the history of the English 
colony and the history of the Native Americans previously inhabiting eastern North America.  
Paul Hulton, a longtime Deputy Keeper in the Department of Prints and Drawings of the British 
Museum, worked alongside Quinn to publish White’s drawings in a limited number of two-
volume sets in 1964.39  For the four hundredth anniversary of Ralegh’s colonies, Hulton 
published a more accessible volume of White’s drawings with introductory matter written to 
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orient readers to the context of the Roanoke expeditions and the few details known about John 
White himself.  America, 1585: The Complete Drawings of John White [1984], is a wonderful 
primary source collection of the most lasting material from the Roanoke expeditions and 
helpfully includes Theodor de Bry’s reinterpretations of White’s images that were most widely 
circulated in the seventeenth century.40 
Employing an Atlantic World approach before it was fashionable, Quinn enlisted the help 
of Irene A. Wright, a historian of Cuba and the wider Caribbean, in collecting and translating the 
most important Spanish documents related to the Roanoke expeditions.  Roanoke Voyages 
contains over fifty documents relating to Spanish knowledge, and misunderstanding, of Ralegh’s 
colonies.  Bernardino de Mendoza’s many reports to King Philip II are probably the most useful 
of these sources.  Mendoza served as the Spanish ambassador to England from 1578 to 1584, 
when he was expelled for his role in a plot against Queen Elizabeth’s life.  Irene A. Wright’s 
own book, Further English Voyages to Spanish America: 1583-1594, is a useful complement to 
Quinn’s documents from Spanish archives published in 1951.41  Paul E. Hoffman’s Spain and 
the Roanoke Voyages [1987] is also a well-written, concise assessment of Spanish knowledge of 
Ralegh’s enterprises based on many of the sources published by Quinn and Wright.42   
During the 1980s, America’s Four Hundredth Anniversary Committee commissioned 
several excellent works relating to the Roanoke Voyages.  Karen Ordahl Kupperman published 
Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony under the auspices of the committee in 1984.43  Hers is a 
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concise telling of the events from 1584 to 1590, and the book’s greatest contribution is its 
emphasis on the few issues that are most important in understanding the successes and failures of 
the colonies.  Kupperman effectively argued that the marriage of colonialism and piracy proved 
unable to establish successful colonies.44  While historians like Kenneth R. Andrews did in-depth 
studies of privateering across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Kupperman made 
Roanoke’s role in this period of tolerated lawlessness her focus.45 Kupperman also aptly 
explained the complicated relationship between Native Americans and Englishmen at Roanoke.  
While Thomas Harriot and John White believed in the benefits of building good relationships 
with the Indians, many in the colony served previously in the brutal Irish conquests of the 1560s 
and 1570s.46  While the colonists desired peaceful relations with the natives, their worldview 
made them unable to trust outsiders, preventing them from pursuing whatever goals of toleration 
they may have brought with them from the Old World to the new one. 
In celebration of the colonies’ anniversary, Quinn wrote Set Fair for Roanoke in 1985, a 
full overview of the Roanoke voyages informed by his decades of study.47  The book fluidly 
employs narrative and analytical sections to communicate the complexities of the topic, making 
it the ideal starting point for new students of the expeditions.  In Set Fair for Roanoke, Quinn 
also includes an assessment of the archaeological research on the island considerably updated 
from the limited information he was able to convey with confidence in 1955.  He understood that 
future breakthroughs in studying Roanoke will almost certainly come through archaeological 
discoveries; therefore, he dedicated considerable attention to the archeological developments that 
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occurred during his career.  His detailed look at the few archaeological remnants of the colony 
updates his assessment in Roanoke Voyages by including studies performed by J. C. Harrington 
in the 1960s and David Phelps in the early 1980s.48  Set Fair for Roanoke remains the most 
complete assessment of Ralegh’s Roanoke colonies today. 
Although this thesis does not focus on the fate of the fabled “Lost Colonists,” works 
exploring their possible fates are an important piece of Roanoke historiography that deserve 
some discussion.  As in the other areas of Roanoke scholarship, Quinn’s assessment of the 
documentary evidence remains the most widely accepted theory regarding the probable fate of 
the 1587 colonists, but his theory is losing its appeal among more popular authors.  Quinn 
believed that some colonists relocated to Croatoan to hail any English ships sailing on the coast, 
in keeping with the enigmatic message discovered on a tree and in the palisade wall on Roanoke 
Island in 1590.49  He argued that the main body of the settlement journeyed north to the 
Chesapeake Bay in keeping with Ralegh’s intended destination for the colony.50  This theory 
reconciles the disparity among Ralegh’s instructions, White’s comment that settlers hoped to 
relocate “fifty miles into the main,” and the “CROATOAN” carving at the settlement site. 
More recent works on Roanoke have departed from Quinn’s opinion on the eventual 
destination of the colonists.  James Horn and Lee Miller take White’s insistence that the 
settlement should relocate “fifty miles into the main” quite literally and argue that the head of the 
Albemarle Sound is their most likely destination.51  Horn believes that the colonists likely 
assimilated with Indians in peace before being killed in the 1650s by Indian tribes coming south 
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from Virginia, while Miller argues that the colonists were likely dispersed and enslaved in the 
service of the Eno tribe deep in North Carolina’s interior.52  Most recently in 2018, Andrew 
Lawler’s The Secret Token: Myth, Obsession, and the Search for the Lost Colony of Roanoke 
presents several hypotheses about the likely racial mixing of Native Americans, Africans, and 
the European colonists.53  The continuing allure of the colonists’ story and the dearth of reliable 
archaeological information discovered so far guarantees that many more books exploring the 
mystery of the Lost Colony will continue to proliferate in the future. 
 While interest in the Lost Colony is understandable for its mystique, a broad view of 
historiographical trends relating to piracy and the first English colonies suggests the need for 
new emphases.  Early modern English piracy has been explored in considerable depth by several 
historians in recent years, contributing new insights on the nature of English maritime culture 
during the sixteenth century and the diversity of possibilities open to British seamen looking to 
secure their fortunes in the rapidly changing economic environment of the sixteenth century 
British Isles.  Given the scope of the studies by Appleby and Hanna, they have chosen to focus 
primarily on incidents of piracy around England itself during the Elizabethan period or those 
expeditions that focused solely on plunder.  This emphasis is justifiable, but expeditions of 
mixed motives typified the period.  Many colonial expeditions engaged in the same type of 
piratical behavior that historians of piracy have emphasized in the English Channel.  The 
Elizabethan colonial literature mostly produced by Quinn and Andrews retains its value as a 
body of detailed information on the first English colonial enterprises, but the expansion of 
scholarship on piracy needs to be coupled with new approaches to these early ventures.  A return 
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to the primary sources of the period bring new characters into the forefront of England’s 
overseas expansion from the period and further erode the national histories of the early twentieth 
century.  The first English attempts to make colonies abroad would be a piratical affair.    
 
Chapter Two: “Sundry and Divers Piracies and Spoiles”: English Piracy and the Beginnings of 
English Overseas Expanison under Elizabeth I1 
Sixteenth century England had a piracy problem.  Far from being a new phenomenon at 
the time, piracy had long been a part of English maritime culture.  The English state found it 
difficult to secure justice in a fragmented realm in which influential Englishmen supported illicit 
acts at sea for their own profit.  These landsmen often protected and resupplied pirates, the 
sources of great wealth and cheap goods taken from unwilling merchantmen traversing the 
waters around the British Isles.  These pirates and their abettors formed the main body of 
promoters and participants in growing English engagement in the wider world through trade 
expeditions and colonizing enterprises in the later years of the sixteenth century.  English 
maritime culture involved a great deal of ambiguity in the sixteenth century: legitimate spoil to 
some was illegal to others, and the backing of the state often served as a shield of convenience in 
self-interested acts of plunder.  This culture of piracy fueled English depredations in the Atlantic 
World and served as the context of early English expansion in the last decades of the sixteenth 
century.   
Although piracy troubled many medieval English monarchs, acts of piracy seem to have 
escalated rapidly at the end of the fifteenth century and continued to grow throughout the 
sixteenth century.  Historians are in general agreement that diminishing English sea power under 
Henry VI and VII left a vacuum at sea that pirates exploited.2  Piracy always thrives in areas of 
limited state control, but the momentous disintegration of the medieval economic order may also 
explain the rise of depredations at sea.  Core tenants of feudalism – a system largely in its death 
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throes by the start of the fifteenth century – lingered in English consciousness in the form of a 
“feudal ideal” that prized chivalric virtue and a steeply hierarchical class structure, but the 
medieval world fundamentally changed, giving rise to a powerful merchant class and currency 
wealth instead of simply landed wealth.3  These developments, coupled with the rise of 
conspicuous consumption among elites looking to highlight their access to the increasingly far-
flung areas of European exploitation, created an ideal environment for large-scale piracy.  
Merchants at the forefront of a changing world could supply the demand of the wealthy through 
illicit activity at sea.  The collapse of the medieval order also increased vagrancy within many 
communities, and contemporaries understood the role that this had on piracy.  In 1584, Richard 
Hakluyt complained of “many thousandes of idle persons… within this Realme… often fall to 
pilferinge and thevinge and other lewdnes.”4  Such offences led England to be “infamous for our 
outeragious, common, and daily piracies.”5    
Piracy’s prevalence in the middle decades of the sixteenth century is evidenced by the 
large volume of piracy-related complaints found within the proceedings of England’s Privy 
Council during the period.  Composed of the most important ministers and officials in the 
English government, the body gave advice to the monarch on the exercise of royal prerogative, 
heard various complaints from English citizens and foreigners, and helped dictate national policy 
toward the realm’s most pressing issues.  Given the council’s power and its member’s high 
standing, only serious grievances went before the body.  Surprisingly, among the many 
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challenges facing England in the sixteenth century, piracy dominated the council’s meetings 
during the century. 
 In the 1540s, England and France fought much as they had for centuries.  England 
simultaneously found itself at war with Scotland to the north.  Facing adversaries on both sides, 
Henry VIII focused on improving the sparse Royal Navy he inherited from his father, but even 
this was insufficient for the task.  Henry turned to the old practice of issuing letters of reprisal 
and letters of marque to attack enemy ships.6  Letters of reprisal were issued to recuperate losses 
suffered from another nation in satisfaction of an Augustinian understanding of justa causa, 
while letters of marque were also issued to private citizens to allow them to wage maritime 
warfare against a declared enemy.7  This legal distinction produced little bearing on the behavior 
of the merchant-pirates employing their privileges, or alleged privileges, against the 
merchantmen of Europe.   
By using private vessels to accomplish the state’s goals, English naval power swelled to a 
formidable level.  The reprisal system wrought particular havoc on French commerce during the 
war, but its legal ambiguities and the clear ways it lent itself to abuse by unscrupulous seamen 
unleashed as many problems as it solved. During the 1540s, merchant-pirates frequently seized 
French vessels bearing the cargoes of other nations.  For example, Thomas Wyndham, William 
Hawkins, and a host of others became regular defendants before the Privy Council for their 
questionable prizes.  In May 1545, Wyndham possessed two Spanish ships he claimed were 
harboring French goods, though his claim was challenged by their separate owners.8  He had 
already been forced to restore another vessel in early May.9   
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Admittedly, merchants pirating Continental ships did not know the status of the goods on 
board when they attacked a vessel, but once on board a prize, pirates had little incentive to 
release goods of other European nations at peace with England.  Many of these state-sanctioned 
pirates joined Wyndham and his Plymouth associates in seizing Spanish ships allegedly bearing 
French goods.  Spanish merchants were understandably incensed at their sufferings given 
Spain’s neutrality in the conflict, and they frequently brought their claims before the Privy 
Council.10  The council tried to ameliorate the damage done to neutral merchants, but the climate 
of hardly controlled reprisals made it impossible to adequately handle the enormous volume of 
complaints being brought before the body.  Repeat offenders like Wyndham make it clear that 
there was little will within the council to bring serious punishment to those well-placed to defend 
their innocence before them.  These issues of goods, ships, and the validity of each as proper 
prizes in various situations continued throughout the remainder of the century. 
Duplicitous dealing on the part of English merchant-pirates made the Privy Council’s 
task considerably more difficult.  Furthermore, many pirates spoiled vessels of various nations 
with little discretion and without commissions to make reprisals.  Most of the participants in the 
reprisal campaign cared little whose goods they took, as long as they could sell them easily.  
Certain ports reappear repeatedly in the records and served as favorite haunts of these pirates.  
Some pirate nests like Norfolk, Suffolk, Dover and the Cinque Ports, and Southampton were 
historically significant to the realm and had served the monarchy for centuries.11  Nevertheless, 
their regular participation in illegal reprisal activity so embarrassed Queen Elizabeth that she 
issued multiple, lengthy statements against unrestricted piracy.  The queen preferred execution as 
punishment for pirates, complaining in 1564 about the many acts of piracy continuing since 
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peace returned between the English and French, and that “not one [had been] executed or 
punyshed according to their desserts.”12  Elizabeth hoped to see the guilty “executid upon sum 
cliffs nere to the sea side, to the example of others”; nevertheless, piracy remained rampant 
throughout the queen’s reign, speaking clearly as to the profitability of the practice.13 
Unsurprisingly, ports farther from London, the center of royal power, were most 
notorious as havens for pirates.  The West Country ports of Plymouth, Exeter, Falmouth, and 
Bideford consistently appear in the records as the source of piratical violence.14  Cardiff, the 
Welsh port situated directly across from Bristol, became a source of particular concern to the 
English merchant community strongly represented in Bristol.15  Ireland, a consistent source of 
trouble for the crown during the Tudor period, also harbored many pirates, including some 
Scottish pirates who operated there regularly in the early 1570s.16  Given the distance of many of 
these ports from the center of English sea power closer to the Thames, the crown struggled to 
secure justice in many cases.  Oftentimes, pirates’ names appear repeatedly in the Acts of the 
Privy Council, with no apparent consequences for their many depredations on legal shipping.  
This problem highlights one of the most important factors in piracy at all times in all places: 
piracy only succeeded through the complicity of their aiders and abettors on land. 
If universally feared and hated, pirates would have lived in an untenably vulnerable state 
during the sixteenth century.  Like all seamen before and after, these pirates relied on many 
different people in their ports of operation to victual and outfit their ships for action.  These 
“pirate nests,” as historian Mark Hanna has called them, made piratical enterprise possible and 
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became fixtures throughout the expansion of the first British Empire.17  The support these 
landsmen gave pirates during the period initially seems to present a mystery, but there are 
indications in the records of the Privy Council’s meetings that the opportunity to purchase 
foreign goods at cheap prices drove these landed English people to lend the terrors of merchant 
shipping their aid.  The council understood this issue, making a point to target the “aiders, 
maineteyners, or abettours” in order to stop pirates seemed most successful at disappearing in 
their home ports.18  Even the Spanish ambassador understood the source of piracy’s strength in 
England, asking the council to stop those “who gyveth them assystence and succour of victualles 
and suche other furniture as they want.”19  The decentralized English state relied on the 
cooperation of local officials to execute the crown’s justice, but outlying regions often saw little 
benefit to following the mandates of a distant government with little authority in their 
jurisdictions. 
English piracy against neutral shipping served as a source of consistent embarrassment to 
the crown throughout the middle decades of the sixteenth century.  Prizes seized illegally quickly 
became international incidents.  The Spanish Ambassador, Antonio de Guarás, complained 
regularly before the council during the 1570s of consistent spoilage of Spanish vessels at the 
hands of English pirates.20  Spanish losses at the hands of merchant-pirates contributed 
substantially to the deterioration of Anglo-Spanish relations during the period.  Men from the 
West Country were particularly anti-Spanish in the years leading to the official outbreak of the 
Anglo-Spanish War in 1585.  This held important benefits for the realm since a Spanish invasion 
of England would be made difficult in the West Country, which presented a geographically 
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convenient place for a Spanish invasion.  As a result of their strategic importance and the sheer 
distance from London, the West Countrymen had long been jealous of their regional 
distinctiveness, as evidenced in the Cornish Tax Revolt of 1497 and Prayer Book Rebellion of 
1549.21 
As Mark Hanna has argued, the Killigrew family of Cornwall represent many of the most 
salient issues relating to English piracy in the sixteenth century.22  The Killigrews enjoyed many 
privileges from the crown in exchange for their loyalty in defending Pendennis Castle, the most 
important fortification in the West Country, guarding the harbor of Carrick Roads near 
Falmouth.  John Killigrew III constructed the castle under Henry VIII’s patronage in 1540 as the 
prospect of major conflict with Continental Catholic powers became increasingly likely in the 
aftermath of the English Reformation.23 His son, Sir John Killigrew IV, was appointed to the 
Commission for the Suppression of Piracy in Cornwall in a laughable gesture considering his 
deep involvement in sea-raiding.  Despite their prominent roles as the Governors of Pendennis 
Castle, one of the Killigrews was named alongside Henry Stanguishe, a notorious pirate 
operating on the Irish coast in the early 1550s.24  In 1576, the Privy Council wrote to several 
prominent men of the West Country, Sir John Killigrew among them, with concerns about the 
apparent embezzling of goods taking place before prize goods were reported to the Admiralty.25  
Their concerns were validated in 1577 as evidence emerged that Killigrew bought French wine 
from a pirate named Robert Hicks.26  Despite their reputation, the family continued to enjoy the 
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crown’s support, and Sir John Killigrew’s eldest son, also named John, became Vice Admiral of 
Cornwall in 1587.27 
The case of the Killigrews and the general inability of the English government to 
suppress rampant piracy during the period casts some suspicion on the Lord High Admiral 
himself, the person most responsible for suppressing the alarming number of piracy incidents 
within the realm.  Charged with overseeing English welfare on the high seas, admirals should 
have been particularly concerned about the prevalence of piracy on the English coast, but most 
who held the role were not.  Indeed, admirals gained one tenth of the value of a prize declared 
valid under the law.28  This rewarded a liberal interpretation of legitimate prizes and led multiple 
Lord Admirals to forgo their duties in important ways.  Thomas Seymour, a Lord Admiral during 
the reign of Henry VIII, faced trial for treason in 1549 under thirty-three distinct articles of high 
treason.  Among them were several relating to his failure to punish pirates and his active 
encouragement of piracy “as though [he] were authorized to be the chief pirate.”29      
The career of John Callis illustrates many of the issues germane to the complicated issue 
of pirate justice and toleration in sixteenth century England.  Callis became well-known in the 
highest circles of English government for his considerable success in spoiling many ships during 
the 1570s.30  The foremost historian of English piracy, John C. Appleby, argues that Callis and 
his large gang of pirates represented a “professionalization” of piracy in the English Channel 
with their more organized approach to piratical activity.31  As mentioned previously, the Privy 
Council was unable to secure justice against the pirates operating primarily out of Cardiff in 
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Wales, and in various other ports on the eastern coast of Ireland.  Callis operated in these locales 
with a large entourage of associates, including Killigrew’s former partner, Robert Hicks, who 
helped Callis take many ships during the 1570s.32  His successful piracies apparently held 
international appeal, as evidenced by his recruitment of Simão Fernandes, an Azorean pilot who 
served previously under the Spanish.33  Callis brought the disillusioned pilot into his orbit just 
before making a lucrative cruise to Fernandes’s native Azores.34  Charles L’Estrange Ewen, 
Callis’s sole biographer, suggested that the pirate was probably illiterate.35  If so, enlisting 
Fernandes, who received world-class training as a Spanish pilot and was literate in at least 
Portuguese, Spanish, and English, gave him advantages over any other pirate operating in the 
region.   
Callis proved difficult to catch, primarily because his hosts in Cardiff were unwilling to 
cooperate with authorities since losing Callis meant losing access to cheap, foreign goods.  The 
Privy Council wrote a frustrated letter to Sir John Perrot in January 1577, alleging that “their 
Lordships do not a letill mervell at the negligence of suche as are Justices in those partes, that, 
knowing the said Callice to be so notable and offendour and spoiler of suche her Majesties 
neighbors as are in good league and amytie with her… wold suffer him to departe in that order 
and not apprehend him.”36  Weary of seeing pirates “suffered to departe and wincked at,” the 
council complained that “for a shewe and colour of justice, [they] have apprehendid some of the 
poorest and permitted the chiefest pirattes to escape.”37  Discovering “what persons have bought 
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and receaved suche goodes and merchaundizes as have ben broughte in and solde by the pirattes 
aforesaide” was the key to bringing them to justice.38     
Eventually Callis’s luck evaporated, and he was committed to the Tower of London in 
1577.39  His friend Robert Hicks was hanged during his custody, but Callis secured his own 
release through passionate pleas to Sir Francis Walsingham, the Principal Secretary of the Privy 
Council.  Promising to fight piracy in the British Isles and to repay his multinational victims for 
their losses, he eventually received his freedom.40  Ultimately, Callis returned to piracy and 
raided shipping of many nations throughout the early 1580s and played a significant role in 
Humphrey Gilbert’s colonial schemes in 1578 and 1583.  A curious suggestion Callis made to 
Walsingham during his imprisonment is also worth mentioning.  Callis suggested that 
Walsingham employ one Solivan Beere, a pirate operating in Ireland, as a pilot.41  While 
Walsingham apparently did not do so, he did indeed employ the Azorean Fernandes at this time.  
Fernandes had been condemned to the hangman’s noose as a result of his association with 
Callis’s gang of pirates, but his wide-ranging talents and experiences convinced Walsingham to 
intervene in his case.42  This connection between Callis, Beere, and Fernandes has been 
overlooked by historians, unintentionally denying Callis a place of importance that he deserves 
in the beginnings of English activity abroad.  Walsingham persuaded Fernandes to stop wasting 
his talents on petty piracy, and instead secured his invaluable talents and insatiable desire to 
harm the Spanish for the timely needs of expanding English interest in exploiting the Atlantic 
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World.  By the end of the sixteenth century, few men had contributed more knowledge, skill, and 
piratical impulses to the first English colonies than Fernandes. 
Elizabeth’s policy toward punishing piracy on the high seas was as inconsistent and 
ambiguous as her notoriously unpredictable foreign policy.  The widely varying levels of 
enforcement highlights Elizabeth’s willingness to look away from the illegal acts of those who 
could benefit her rule.  She needed the unquestioning loyalty of the Killigrews to bolster the 
logical route of invasion for her state that had become a religious pariah among the powers of 
Europe.  She also needed the support of the great merchant families of England, rising in 
prominence in the increasingly interconnected trade networks being created by the demand for 
commodities only recently available from throughout the Atlantic World.  This emboldened 
merchants like the Hawkins family to seek higher profits during their trading expeditions through 
piratical acts.  These attacks were not state-sanctioned acts later called “privateering,” but they 
were acts of convenience born from an environment of apathy toward those parties with the 
power and willingness to support the queen against her rivals.  Queen Elizabeth used a similar 
model of patronage to grant her nominal authority, if not her outright support, to colonial 
promoters looking to swell English prestige – and wealth – through overseas enterprises.   
When England first ventured into the wider Atlantic World, they did so as interlopers in a 
zone already heavily exploited by their Continental rivals.  Spain was the first European nation to 
claim and exploit large swaths of territory in the Americas.  Their strong claim came by virtue of 
their sponsorship of Columbus’ multiple voyages of discovery and their close relationship with 
Pope Alexander VI, who generously granted these lands to the Spanish sovereigns, Ferdinand 
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and Isabella, in the papal bull, Inter Caetera, in 1493.43  The Portuguese, who led many 
pioneering expeditions to the African coast in the fifteenth century, also benefited from this act 
which granted them the territory east of the Line of Demarcation, further formalized in the 1494 
Treaty of Tordesillas.44  Other European powers simply rejected these claims.  The French King 
Francis I’s alleged remark that he “much desired to see Adam’s testament to know how he 
divided the world” accurately reflected non-Iberian opinion on the pope’s donation.45   
The French were the first to seriously challenge Spanish supremacy in the Americas.  
England dispatched John Cabot to survey North America in 1497, but Henry VII and VIII did 
little to capitalize on his claims for the crown.  In contrast, France saw an opportunity to siphon 
the American wealth flowing into the Spanish coffers through irregular maritime warfare.  As 
early as the 1520s, French corsairs were already challenging Spain’s sea lanes, as evidenced by 
their momentous capture of a ship bearing Aztec gold sent to Spain by Cortes in 1523.46  These 
raids continued intermittently throughout the early decades of the sixteenth century from pirate 
hideouts on the north coast of Hispaniola. 
The greater Caribbean held the focus of French involvement in the Atlantic basin 
throughout much of the sixteenth century.  With religious upheaval threatening the stability of 
the state in the 1560s, Admiral Gaspar de Coligny authorized Jean Ribault, a French Protestant 
Huguenot, to settle a community of his coreligionists in the land claimed by the Spanish as 
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“Florida.”47  Ribault left his settlement on modern Parris Island to secure supplies in Europe, but 
before he could return, the remaining settlers abandoned the settlement and made a harrowing 
trip across the Atlantic in a small boat.48  René de Laudonnière carried Ribault’s mission forward 
by founding another Huguenot settlement called La Caroline on the modern St. Johns River in 
1565.  The location of the settlement was immediately practical.  Laudonnière claimed that 
mutiny led some of his men to seize Spanish prizes in the Caribbean, but the Spanish believed 
that a desire for plunder informed the entire enterprise.49  The Spanish struck swiftly to prevent 
the French settlement from causing them serious damage.  Shortly after Ribault relieved 
Laudonnière of command, nearly all of La Caroline’s settlers were killed by Spanish soldiers 
under Pedro Menéndez de Avilés.50  The Spanish founded San Agustín nearby to secure the 
northern reaches of the empire.  It would be over twenty years before another European power 
would attempt to settle the eastern coast of North America. 
By the middle of the sixteenth century, English commerce and trade took place around 
the Atlantic Rim and within Eurasia’s interior, despite their relative lack of involvement in the 
Americas.  Enterprising merchants sold English exports, particularly woolen cloth, in Antwerp, 
Seville, Muscovy, the Levant, Persia, the Guinea Coast, and the Caribbean.  In return, foreign 
goods like pepper, silk, and olive oil returned to England to be sold.  The Iberian powers 
dubiously viewed the legality of this trade, especially in Guinea and the Caribbean, because of 
their exclusive claims outlined in the Treaty of Tordesillas.  During the 1550s and 1560s, Spain 
and Portugal increasingly challenged and blocked English trading efforts in their exclusive 
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zones.  Many prominent English merchants engaged in these illicit trades untrammeled, and 
many of the most prominent sea-dogs of the subsequent decades gained their first sea experience 
on these voyages.  As Kenneth R. Andrews argued, “European overseas expansion in this epoch 
was fundamentally a commercial movement, an extension of the European trading system…. It 
was not a pacific movement, but an acquisitive and predatory drive for commodities and for the 
profits to be made on the rich products of the outer world.”51  
Martin Frobisher, who eventually led three expeditions to the Arctic in search of the 
Northwest Passage and precious metals, began his long career at sea as a young man in illicit 
trade on the Guinea Coast.52  He sailed with Thomas Wyndham – previously mentioned with 
regard to his piratical excesses during conflict with France in the 1540s – to Benin on a 
troublesome trading mission in 1554 in which about two thirds of all participants died from 
disease and lack of victuals.53  Wyndham himself died before the expedition left Africa, and the 
men got into trouble with the Portuguese who regularly traded in the area by pillaging several of 
their ships in search of loot to supplement the supply of pepper that the king of Benin gave 
them.54  Frobisher was fortunate to survive that mission and the others that followed.  The 
Portuguese held him as a prisoner for much of 1555 as a result of his participation in the illegal 
trade.55  Frobisher’s difficult entry into the English maritime world foreshadowed many of the 
failures that typified the remainder of his career. 
Trading missions like Wyndham’s were profitable, but not extraordinarily so; however, 
the opportunity to take prizes of convenience did offer the lure of substantial reward.  John 
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Hawkins’s career began similarly, as an interloper in the Spanish-dominated Caribbean slave 
trade.56  The Hawkins family of Plymouth was one of several in the West Country that 
dominated English maritime activity in the sixteenth century and serve as centerpieces in 
common images of the Elizabethan Sea Dogs.  Hawkins’s father, William Hawkins, pioneered 
the way for future English overseas expeditions.  According to Richard Hakluyt, William 
Hawkins sailed to “Brasil” in 1530 and 1532, and made an earlier voyage elsewhere.57  It is 
likely but unproven that this earlier voyage is the one recorded by the Spanish authorities in the 
Caribbean in 1527, and the first mention of an English ship being allowed to dock in a Spanish-
American port.58  The Spanish officials who received the English ship were evidently so 
surprised to see the foreign vessel that they completely neglected to identify the captain.59  The 
Spanish half-heartedly drove away this first of many ambiguously-intentioned vessels sent by 
England generally, and the Hawkins family particularly.    
John Hawkins succeeded his father in becoming Plymouth’s leading merchant-pirate. His 
three major expeditions to Africa and Spanish America during the 1560s followed a similar 
pattern.  Hawkins and his men sailed to the African coast to acquire slaves either through trade or 
by pirating the human cargo of the Portuguese slave traders on that coast.  The expeditions then 
took their slaves to the Caribbean, where restrictive Spanish trade policies left them starving for 
labor, especially as Native American populations vanished in the early decades of the sixteenth 
century.  Frequently, Spanish colonial officials offered token resistance to Hawkins’s efforts to 
engage in illicit trade, but trade usually commenced anyways with little violent persuasion from 
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the Englishmen.  Spanish colonies desperately wanted the slaves and goods the English carried, 
and Hawkins was more than willing to create the appearance of forced trade if it meant wealth 
for him and his crew. 
 While fairly practical profit motives first spurred English involvement in Atlantic piracy 
and illicit trade, ideological divisions birthed from the Protestant Reformation promulgated 
nationalism and inspired fierce rivalries.  With England’s departure from the Catholic Church 
under Henry VIII, Catholic Spain became the primary target of English aggression in the latter 
half of the sixteenth century. Spain was not only unapologetically committed to the Catholic 
cause, they were also becoming increasingly wealthy from their American conquests.  Most 
notably, Mexico and Peru filled the Spanish coffers with gold and silver extracted from the 
Americas.  Phillip II’s marriage to Mary I gave him temporary kingship over England from 1556 
to 1558, when she died, and he extended an offer of marriage to Queen Elizabeth upon her 
ascension.60  In many cases, national rivalries proved surmountable in the pursuit of religious 
aims.  Hawkins called at Laudonnière’s settlement in this spirit in 1564 and sold the French 
Protestants a ship of provisions in exchange for some cannons and ammunition.61  According to a 
participant on the expedition, the French had “made the inhabitants weary of them by their dayly 
craving of maiz.”62  Hawkins’s interest in helping secure Protestant bases on the east coast of 
North America must have made an impression on his young cousin, Francis Drake, participating 
in his first voyage to the West Indies.63  Drake paid a similar call to the next hopeful pirate base, 
                                                      
60 Henry Kamen, Philip of Spain (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 72. 
61 Kelsey, Hawkins, 29-30. 
62 “Report on Florida” in Quinn, et. al., eds, New American World: A Documentary History of North 
America to 1612, vol. II (New York, NY: Arno Press, 1979), 366. 
63 Kelsey, Hawkins, 19. 
 
 43 
founded in 1585, farther up the coast as its relations with the Native Americans soured over their 
“craving of maiz.” 
The increasingly brazen acts of many of England’s seamen soured the relationship 
between Spain and England, particularly after Hawkins and Drake were attacked in 1568 while 
illegally trading with the Spanish in Veracruz.64  This experience drove the illicit traders into 
open hostility with Spain.  Drake began his illustrious career alongside Hawkins, his second 
cousin, in his slaving missions to the African coast.  Hawkins’s expeditions are central in the 
beginnings of early English expansion on their own merits, but the valuable experience they gave 
Drake stands as their most important consequence.  When Hawkins and Drake arrived at San 
Juan de Ulúa to trade in Veracruz, they anticipated the same behavior the Spanish displayed on 
their previous voyages throughout the Caribbean when approached by the English traders.  In 
Veracruz, however, the Englishmen received a stiff refusal and were ambushed by a Spanish 
fleet.65  Drake and Hawkins barely escaped with their lives.  For the English, the Battle of San 
Juan de Ulúa became symbolic of the treachery of the Spanish, driving men like Drake into a 
life-long commitment to pillaging the Spanish Empire. 
Drake came to be the most feared man in the Spanish mind in the 1570s.  In 1572, he 
raided the Spanish Main at Nombre de Dios and captured a mule train of silver and gold bullion 
on the isthmus in 1573.  Ironically, the former slaver took his prize with the assistance of 
cimarones, independent communities of escaped black slaves.66  Despite their importance, his 
accomplishments went publicly unrecognized by the English government to mitigate the damage 
done to their diplomatic relationship with Spain.  Nevertheless, Queen Elizabeth’s discreet 
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support for Drake’s acts of plunder illustrates a principle already stated with regard to piracy 
close to the British Isles: Elizabeth gladly embraced almost any brazen act that filled her coffers 
or furthered her own policy goals, while shunning more petty acts of violence that could only 
embarrass her on the international stage.      
In 1577, Drake embarked on the journey that became the centerpiece of his career: the 
first English circumnavigation of the world.  However, his voyage was more than merely a 
sailing accomplishment for England since he raided Spanish shipping at every opportunity, 
especially on the Pacific coast of the Americas.  Drake struck fear in his men through his harsh 
treatment of any sign of insubordination among his crewmen.67  Most pirating expeditions during 
the period struggled to keep their crews focused on the task at hand, but Drake’s tough 
leadership style proved effective.  When Drake arrived in Plymouth in 1580, the treasure he had 
taken shocked Queen Elizabeth.  While trying to suppress his most remarkable story, she had the 
commoner knighted for his service and awarded arms.  Drake became England’s favorite hero of 
the sea and inspired the hopes of younger sons and commoners like him all over the island.  
Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza forebodingly reported to Phillip II that “this bait 
will certainly attract greedy people to help the enterprise, which they think will turn out as rich as 
Drake’s last voyage.”68  Julian S. Corbett called him a “statesman” and “one of the great military 
figures of the Reformation,” but Drake’s behavior in his circumnavigation shows him as a pirate 
above all else.69   
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 Spain did not sit idly while its rivals plundered its New World wealth.  After the sack of 
Havana by the French in 1555, Spanish officials there pushed for radical improvements to the 
city’s lackluster defenses that were quite insufficient for a city of its growing importance in the 
region.  Havana became one of Spain’s most important New World settlements, serving as a 
convenient collection point for the rich commodities of the Americas before being sent to 
Seville.  For the remainder of the sixteenth century, Spain dedicated considerable funds toward 
building impressive fortifications at La Fuerza, El Morro, and La Punta worthy of a city of such 
importance.70  Santo Domingo, Cartagena, and Nombre de Dios also embarked on ambitious 
fortification projects because of consistent depredations by French and later English marauders.71  
The Spanish also instituted the fleet system to deal with the threat posed to their New World 
wealth.  Single ships laden with valuable goods easily fell into pirate hands in the early decades 
of the sixteenth century, but by combining vessels into regularly-scheduled flotas, small-scale 
pirates stood little chance of making a major haul.  The fleet system did make the shipments 
fairly predictable, however, giving the Caribbean economy and its vulnerability to plunder a 
seasonal component.72 
 Spain’s empire proved too far-flung to be protected fully from those intent on skimming 
wealth from its surface, but during the sixteenth century Spain’s defenses proved sufficient to 
prevent major damage to their overseas empire.  A long-view of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries highlights the foolishness of some Englishmen’s firm faith that the empire represented 
a rotten edifice merely waiting to collapse.  Paul Hoffman’s research demonstrates clearly the 
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ability of Spanish Caribbean defenses to adapt to the changing political circumstances and the 
varying levels of corsair activity in the Antilles and the Main.73   
 Ultimately, outright war did erupt from the culture of tolerated piracy under Elizabeth 
and the English aid given to the Dutch rebels plaguing Philip II in the Low Countries.  Several 
members of the queen’s inner circle had been agitating for war with Spain for several years.  Sir 
Francis Walsingham, the Privy Council’s Principal Secretary, was foremost among this group, 
alongside the Earl of Leicester and Walter Ralegh.  John Hawkins, the famous merchant-pirate, 
also advocated for war against the Spaniard from his post as Treasurer of the Royal Navy.74  The 
cold war between the countries turned hot after English ships were arrested in Spanish harbors 
on May 26, 1585.75  In response, Elizabeth licensed many of the pirates responsible for the 
deterioration of her relationship with Spain to conduct legalized, private warfare against the 
Spanish.76  With a few important exceptions, the English prosecuted the war through the use of 
these private individuals rather than through the Royal Navy.77   
 Three major piratical expeditions opened England’s war effort against Spain in 1585 and 
deserve special consideration in understanding the nature of the Anglo-Spanish conflict.  Bernard 
Drake and Amyas Preston outfitted the Golden Royal to resupply Ralegh’s new colony on 
Roanoke Island, but they were redirected by the queen to the large, international fishing 
community exploiting the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.78  The expedition hoped to warn the 
English fishing fleet not to go to Spain due to the recent embargo and looked to capitalize on the 
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opportunity to plunder the relatively undefended Iberian fishing vessels.  As a consolation for 
losing his colony’s resupply to the piratical scheme, Queen Elizabeth transferred the bulk of the 
expedition’s expected proceeds to Ralegh.79  Preston seized a Portuguese ship bearing Brazilian 
sugar and abandoned the main enterprise to get his lucrative prize home quickly.80  Drake 
continued to Newfoundland, successfully warning the Englishmen there to not trade in Spanish 
ports and seizing the cargo from seventeen Portuguese vessels.  Two other English ships joined 
Drake as he sailed to the Azores, taking three Brazilmen and a French vessel sailing from 
Africa.81  Drake and Preston succeeded impressively in achieving all their aims, further 
highlighting the attractions of piracy in the Americas and illustrating the vulnerability of the 
Newfoundland fisheries.    
In coordination with the Newfoundland voyage, Francis Drake and Martin Frobisher led 
thirty-three vessels to the West Indies in 1585 with hopes of seizing the Spanish treasure fleet 
and causing significant damage to Philip II’s overseas empire.82  It was the largest fleet to sail in 
the Americas in the sixteenth century.  Henry and Francis Knollys, two prominent Englishmen, 
participated in the voyage alongside Christopher Carleill, Sir Francis Walsingham’s son-in-law.  
After several delays, the large fleet left Plymouth on September 14, 1585, hoping to recover the 
English vessels seized in Vigo, Spain, and wreak havoc among Spain’s American possessions.  
The expedition sailed to Vigo and successfully freed English captives and gained considerable 
loot.83  They next sailed through the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, as most transatlantic 
voyages did, before menacingly sailing to Santo Domingo on Hispaniola.  The English sacked 
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the city at the heart of the Spanish colonial administration in the region with a resounding victory 
and vindication for those arguing for many years that Spanish America stood ripe for the taking 
by courageous Englishmen.84   
After pillaging Santo Domingo for about one month, the force replicated its earlier 
success in Cartagena on the northern coast of South America.85  With disease affecting many of 
his men and limited plunder compared to his expectations, Drake decided to move quickly north 
toward Cuba and ignore the Panama Isthmus that he had raided in the 1570s.  Drake also passed 
Cuba without attacking Havana, evidently out of concern for the improved defenses erected since 
the French takeover of the city in the 1550s.  Drake did, however, utterly destroy San Agustín in 
Florida, pillaging even the mundane items from the small settlement.86  The expedition failed to 
discover Santa Elena, the Spanish colony further along the coast, but Drake did call at Ralegh’s 
Roanoke colony before returning to England with his spoil.87  Drake probably hoped Ralegh’s 
planned pirate base was already operational, but Roanoke proved woefully insufficient for Drake 
to remain while he waited for the departure of the 1586 treasure fleet.  Drake’s expedition 
returned to England in July 1586 carrying Ralegh’s first colony with it.  The 1585 Roanoke 
expedition itself represents the third part of Elizabeth’s opening barrage against the Spanish that 
year.  It will be considered in detail in a later chapter. 
 Drake’s West Indies raid did not bring the lucrative return that his circumnavigation 
brought to his supporters, but the expedition was extremely important nonetheless.  The voyage 
showed the vulnerability of Spain’s empire to encroachment by the English, a fact that fed the 
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developing “Black Legend” of atrocities committed by the Spanish in America and the 
degeneracy of the Spanish Empire.  Drake did severe damage to Spanish prestige and its ability 
to govern in the West Indies for many years; ultimately, Spain quickly recovered from the 
temporary setback.  Nevertheless, piratical raids on Spanish shipping and vulnerable Spanish 
ports typified the remainder of the war that continued between the two powers until the end of 
Elizabeth’s reign. 
 While piracy of varying levels of state sanction thrived from the English Channel to the 
Caribbean, the first English colonies abroad were organized.  Many of the same motivations that 
drove the English merchant-pirates into the wider Atlantic World and beyond also drove the 
colonial promoters in the 1570s and 1580s.  If Spain could become wealthy through overseas 
colonies, so too could the English.  The expeditions of Hawkins, Drake, Frobisher, and others 
helped establish England’s place in the West and influenced the handling of these colonial 
ventures as they attempted the seemingly impossible task of establishing lasting colonies of 
Englishmen abroad.  At once, piracy became a useful ally and a dangerous enemy of the English 
colonial movement as it began in the latter decades of the sixteenth century. 
 
Chapter Three: Annoying the King of Spain “by Some Colorable Means”: England’s First 
Settlements to Oppose the Spanish1 
Eventually English experiences in the Atlantic World led them to support overseas efforts 
to plant sustainable colonies.  These efforts proved unable to separate themselves from the 
culture of tolerated piracy thriving in the waters around the British Isles and increasingly farther 
from the home ports of many merchant-pirates.  Humphrey Gilbert became the prime mover in 
England’s earliest colonial expeditions, leading fresh efforts in Ireland, England’s oldest colony, 
and in the fertile environment for American colonization.  Though ultimately unsuccessful, 
Humphrey Gilbert deserves a place in colonial history often denied to him because of his 
failures.  Gilbert’s death at sea in 1583 was a tragic loss for the English colonial movement and 
could have seriously diminished interest in such projects if it had not been for his brother’s 
steadfast sponsorship of colonial projects in his stead.  The most tragic consequence of Gilbert’s 
death was the loss of institutional knowledge that his death represented.  Some lessons he learned 
during his career were relearned at Roanoke Island under Ralegh and again on the James River in 
Virginia.  
Gilbert became the first Englishman to receive an American colonial patent from the 
English Crown in 1578, but a long journey of success and failure preceded this momentous 
recognition.2  Gilbert was born to a prominent family of the West Country in the late 1530s and 
served the Crown as a soldier in the English defense of the French Huguenots in the early 1560s.  
Shortly after his return from France, Gilbert apparently first engaged in serious thought about 
overseas colonial enterprises.  His experience in France and the coincidental timing of Jean 
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Ribault and Rene de Laudonniere’s failed expeditions to Florida probably gave him an excellent 
opportunity to learn of the French endeavors in America.  After all, Ribault proposed cooperation 
with the English pirate and mercenary, Thomas Stukeley, to support his French Huguenot colony 
in 1563.3  These close associations between French and English Protestant colonizers probably 
first inclined Gilbert to seriously consider colonization, but in the absence of solid evidence, this 
remains conjecture.   
 Regardless of the circumstances that spurred his involvement, by 1565, Gilbert was 
presenting his arguments for pursuing the Northwest Passage to important players in the queen’s 
court.  At the time, he asked for the right to exploit the trading possibilities of the region himself, 
but the Muscovy Company denied his request.  The company held considerable power as the 
arbiters of trade rights to the East, and they saw no reason to grant considerable power to an 
upstart soldier from the West Country.4  Gilbert never forgot the slight and enacted his future 
plans without the assistance of the company.  Gilbert’s American ambitions were put on hold as 
he went to Ireland in 1566 to pacify the anti-English rebellion in Ulster.  He planned his first 
colonial enterprise for Ulster in 1567, but the instability of the region halted his plans.5  By 1569, 
he had allied with Richard Grenville and several other prominent Englishmen in requesting 
rights to hold ports on the southwest coast of Ireland.6  Gilbert and his partners hoped for rights 
to “make a Corporat Towne, and to fortiffy the same at the haven of Balletemore” and to “have 
lysence of her highnes to have the traffick of the same partes.”7  This fishing area, if fortified by 
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Gilbert and his associates, would have been a strong bulwark against future Spanish aggression 
in Ireland, and would have made an ideal base for piracy, as it did in the seventeenth century.8  
The Munster Rebellion of 1569 prevented this coastal colony from taking hold.  Rather 
than leading an Irish colony, Gilbert became military governor of the Munster region in 
September 1569.9  He pursued his first independent command with vigor, terrorizing the Irish 
locals into submission and solidifying his reputation as the most brutal of Englishmen in an Irish 
context particularly given to barbarism.  Nearly all historians reference Gilbert’s famous rows of 
severed heads leading to his tent in Munster and Thomas Churchyard’s comments about his 
particular disdain for the Irish nobles, but perhaps no feature of Gilbert’s Irish service is more 
important than his knighthood, granted in 1570 after only three months of service in Munster.10  
His scorched-earth tactics temporarily pacified the region, and Queen Elizabeth lauded him with 
that knighthood.  This is a clear statement on the crown’s tolerance of brutal subjugation and the 
ways in which future atrocities would be received in the American context.   
Nathan Probasco argues that Gilbert’s behavior in Munster does not necessarily suggest 
that similar violence would have typified his American expeditions.  He cites Gilbert’s 
preparations for his 1583 colony to indicate his interest in trading with Native Americans rather 
than abusing them and contradicts previous historians who have written disparagingly of 
Gilbert’s prospects for peaceful cohabitation with Indians.11  Probasco’s assumption must be 
rejected in light of the numerous colonial expeditions from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
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centuries that began with apparently sincere intentions to avoid violence with Indians but 
devolved into such behavior nonetheless.  Had Gilbert established colonies in America, his 
treatment of American Indians could have hardly been better than that perpetrated against his 
Irish neighbors. 
 In the early 1570s, Gilbert represented Plymouth in Parliament alongside the pirate 
magnate, John Hawkins.  Gilbert advocated for sweeping monarchical power and royal 
prerogative in the debates of the period.  Such power would be necessary for him to receive the 
colonial power and authority he craved.12  In December 1571, Gilbert and Sir Thomas Smith 
joined forces under a patent from Queen Elizabeth in an alchemical attempt to transmute iron 
into copper.13  The whole affair became a debacle.  Both men lost over £1000 to the dishonest 
connivance of a mineral assayer named William Medley.14  Copper was a necessity in England’s 
vital wool industry, and securing cheap copper held strong allure in the late sixteenth century.  
The first English expeditions to North America became as focused on mineral wealth as their 
Spanish counterparts.  Gilbert and Smith’s interaction at this juncture is important, as it likely 
gave them a chance to discuss their mutual interests in Irish colonization schemes.  
 Sir Thomas Smith was among the first to articulate an ideological vision for English 
colonies in his plans for his Irish colonies in the 1570s.  Smith, an academic once called the 
“flower of the University of Cambridge,” argued for Irish colonization using Roman 
precedents.15  He argued that “England was as uncivil as Ireland until colonies of Romans 
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brought their laws and orders, whose moulds no nation hath more truly kept.”16  In Smith’s mind, 
England was ready to bestow the blessings of civilization that had been learned at the hands of 
the Roman conquerors.  This ancient precedent remained a modus operandi for later colonial 
efforts in Virginia.  John White included blue-painted Picts in his 1585 watercolors of the 
Algonquian Indians of Ralegh’s Virginia, reminding the home country of the savage beginnings 
of the English people.  William Strachey expounded it further in explaining the necessity of 
violence against the natives of Virginia, stating: “Had not this violence, and this Injury, bene 
offred unto us by the Romanis… we might yet have lyved overgrowne Satyrs, rude and untutred, 
wandring in the woodes, dwelling in Caves, and hunting for our dynners… prostetuting our 
daughters to straungers… eating our owne Children…”17  With such expectations, extreme 
violence could easily be justified.  
 These ancient precedents informed Smith’s efforts, but none of his Irish colonies proved 
permanent.  He organized his first colonial venture throughout 1572 and 1573.  Although he 
hoped to lead this colony to the north coast of Ireland himself, the queen appointed him as her 
ambassador in France, which left the colony in the care of his illegitimate son, also named 
Thomas.18  The young Thomas struggled to assemble a substantive expedition after organizing 
several hundred men in Liverpool; most slipped away, leaving only one hundred men to settle 
the plantation in the Ards Peninsula.19  The local Irish lords were incensed at the 360,000 acre 
tract carved from their land claims for Smith’s use and resisted the enterprise at every turn.20  Sir 
Thomas sent reinforcements to his fledgling colony in the spring of 1573, but they never made it 
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to Ireland.  The lure of easy coastal piracy drew them away from Smith’s unprofitable mission.21  
As the colony collapsed, young Thomas Smith’s own Irish servants murdered him.22 
 Wracked by grief over his son’s loss, and presumably reinforced in his opinion on the 
barbarity of the native Irish, Sir Thomas Smith persevered in his mission to settle a successful 
colony in Ireland.  He began organizing his second expedition within a year of his son’s death.  
In December 1573, he wrote elaborate plans for his colony that were, remarkably, only 
discovered by researchers in 1955 when they were deposited in the Essex Record Office.23  
Smith envisioned a neo-feudal society of manorial lords capable of bringing large numbers of 
soldiers and farmers to protect and provide for the colony.24  His plan provided “Elizabetha,” his 
strong fortified city, a grand strategy of military government and a guide to the minutiae of 
matter such as the fines to be levied for untilled acreage.25  Ultimately, Smith’s obsessive, hands-
on approach could not prevent a collapse similar to his lackluster previous effort.  His brother, 
George, led the colony alongside its military commander, Jerome Brett.  Brett did not follow 
Smith’s instructions in Ireland and made an enemy of the Lord Deputy of Ireland, William 
Fitzwilliam.26  With continuous Irish attacks on his settlement, and his inability to achieve his 
high aims for the colony, he relinquished his rights to the land to the Earl of Essex in 1575.27  
Smith died shortly thereafter in 1577, but his plans for a colonial feudalism did not die with him; 
they returned and informed several of the earliest attempts to settle English colonies beyond 
Ireland.      
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 While Smith struggled with his colonies in Ireland, Gilbert remained busy in the service 
of the queen.  He spent a short stint in the defense of the Netherlands and returned to England in 
1572.28  He served faithfully in Parliament for several years and became an increasingly 
important member of Queen Elizabeth’s circle.  He advocated for the establishment of a school 
in London focused on the practical applications of the emerging scientific fields of the period, 
especially those with military and maritime utility.29  His Discourse of a Discoverie for a New 
Passage to Cataia, written mostly in 1566, was finally published in 1576 for the benefit of 
Martin Frobisher’s expedition to Meta Incognita that year.  Gilbert never became deeply 
involved in Frobisher’s affair; he was listed as a subscriber to Frobisher’s third voyage but 
apparently never paid his subscription fee.30  His Discourse did bring him into the orbit of still 
more people who were to prove influential in the early days of English maritime expansion, 
particularly the mysterious polymath, John Dee.31 
 Frobisher’s three expeditions to the Arctic from 1576-1578 did considerable damage to 
English enthusiasm for overseas projects that might have profited Gilbert and his 
contemporaries.  Despite their transience, the voyages’ importance for the trajectory of 
subsequent English colonial ventures cannot be overstated.  The queen, and Frobisher’s other 
investors, lost enormous sums of money in pursuit of mineral wealth in the Northwest.  The first 
expedition returned in 1576 with a mysterious “blacke stoune, as great as a halfe pennye loaf” to 
the ruin of the entire venture.32  These expeditions initially departed England in hopes of finding 
the fabled Northwest Passage, but the possibility of attaining the mineral wealth perceived to be 
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swelling Spanish coffers in preceding decades diverted the entire purpose of the mission to 
mining the strange ore.  Mineral assayers in London gave competing assessments of Frobisher’s 
rocck, and the queen contributed a sizeable investment in Frobisher’s scheme.  The enormous 
weight of the venture increasingly came to rest on the hopes of extracting tons of gold from the 
Arctic.  By 1578, it became painfully clear that Frobisher’s errand was a total fiasco.  
 In this context, Gilbert abandoned his former interest in the Northwest, and by 1577 
Gilbert’s colonial ambitions farther south were full-grown.  He sent two incendiary documents to 
the queen on November 6, 1577, with his plans to “annoy the king of Spayne.”33  These 
documents are remarkable for their outspoken, peacetime militancy against Spain and their place 
as the first extended argument for a piratical colonial scheme.  One of the documents, 
presumably meant to be read first by the queen, argues that weakening the might of Spain should 
be England’s top strategic priority, accomplishable by focusing on purging the power of English 
Catholic elements “not by banishment, or by fire, and sworde, but by diminishing theire 
habilities by purse, creditt and force.”34  Once the homeland is in order, Elizabeth should attend 
to the “deminishing of their forces by sea… eyther by open hostilytie, or by some colorable 
meanes.”35  Gilbert describes such means: 
geving of lycence under lettres patentes to discover and inhabyte some strange place… 
your highnes lettres patentes being a manyfest shewe that it was not your Majestes 
pleasure so to have it.  After the publick notyse of which fact, your Majestie is either to 
avowe the same (if by the event thereof it shall so seme good) or to disavowe both them 
and the fact, as league breakers, leaving them to pretend yt as done without your 
pryvitie….36 
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In this short passage, Gilbert gave Queen Elizabeth a powerful cover for her support of illicit 
piracy against the Spanish: plausible deniability.  David Beers Quinn hinted at this idea, but 
ultimately concluded that the queen was not particularly interested in Gilbert’s militaristic 
scheme since the patent he eventually received contained less overtly militaristic language.37  
The chain of events that followed, however, suggest that the queen supported Gilbert’s ideas, 
especially since they afforded her plausible deniability.  Through colonial patents to settle 
America, the queen could legally sanction English action in the West.  When her crews of pirates 
predictably sacked Spanish holdings across the Atlantic, she could plead ignorance before the 
offended monarch of Spain.  For Elizabeth, whose ambiguous foreign policy is most noteworthy 
of all early modern monarchs, Gilbert gave a perfectly practical means of opposing Spain by 
licensing her subordinates to prosecute open hostility in ways that the state could not.  In this 
way, Elizabeth’s colonial patents served the same purpose as a letter of marque. 
 Beyond this possible framework for future ventures, Gilbert gave specific details 
regarding his plans.  He proposed sending a fleet to plunder the Newfoundland fisheries, an 
international hub of activity shared rather collegially by many of the nations of Europe.38  The 
participants should then return to England and pretend to be merely common pirates offloading 
their plunder on the coast.  Some would certainly face prison for their actions, but this was 
necessary in order to confirm the ruse.  As these actions were being performed, Gilbert argued 
that a second expedition of many ships of war and five to six thousand men should establish a 
base for resupply somewhere in the West.  This base could serve to outfit the ships necessary to 
make a final push to the West Indies.39   
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 Gilbert’s second letter to the queen from November 6, 1577, outlines the necessity and 
relative ease of taking the West Indies from the Spanish.  He believed that Hispaniola and Cuba 
should be taken by the English, “which maye easely be done because there is but fewe people in 
them both.”40  Gilbert reminded the queen that these attacks would be aided by “a great number 
of Negros… that some tyme were slaves and have ronn away from theire Masters,” just as Drake 
had used maroons in his Panamanian raid in 1573.41  Meanwhile, English ships should be 
dispatched to the “Iland of Bearmunda,” so they could lie in wait for the Spanish treasure fleet, 
“which treasure hath been the principall aide wherewith to do all the great actes that… the 
Emperour Charles did in his tyme and the pryde of the Spanyardes to this day.”42  Gilbert closed 
his argument with a plea for his own flexibility in executing these matters: “There may be many 
thinges more saide in this behalfe which I leave because the tyme will best shewe them when this 
shalbe put in execution.”43  The Spanish Empire seemed a rotten edifice to Gilbert; all he needed 
was the queen’s permission to kick the door in the West Indies. 
 Gilbert’s bold anti-Spanish plans were brash and reckless, but his ideas seem to have 
informed the opening of hostilities at the beginning of the Anglo-Spanish War.  The expeditions 
of Preston and Drake to Newfoundland, Drake’s West Indies Raid, and Ralegh’s plans for a 
pirate base on the east coast of North America fit Gilbert’s framework of Spanish opposition 
with remarkable precision.  Given the surviving evidence, it is impossible to know whether 
Gilbert’s plans directly informed English strategy in the years following his unexpected death in 
1583, or whether his writings merely indicate a man well-connected with the general spirit of the 
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times.  While planting colonies or basing pirates in the Americas were not new concepts, 
Gilbert’s formulation of a unified strategy to destroy Spanish domination in the West Indies 
seems to be a unique development, giving his ideas life after death.   
 Gilbert received his patent to “have hould occupie and enjoye” lands “not actually 
possessed of any Christian prince or people” on June 11, 1578.44  His was the first such patent 
granted by the queen.  The queen did make some important adjustments to Gilbert’s proposal, 
however, granting his rights “nowe in this jorney for discovery or in the seconde jorney for 
conquest hereafter….”45 While much of the patent should be seen only a pretense for Gilbert’s 
anti-Spanish activities, this adjustment for a preliminary voyage of discovery seems to reflect the 
queen’s will in the matter.  Future colonial enterprises relied heavily on these reconnaissance 
expeditions for much information about the places they planned to inhabit.  Gilbert’s patent is a 
convenient marker for the beginning of English expansion into the Western Hemisphere, but this 
initial patent was largely a pretense for Gilbert’s piratical schemes in the West Indies with the 
possibility of legitimate colonization only if necessary for the completion of the mission.  Gilbert 
had already begun gathering ships, sailors, and supplies for his proposed expedition to “annoy 
the kyng of Spayne” before his patent was written.   
Bernardino de Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador in London, wrote King Philip II 
regarding Gilbert’s activities throughout the spring and summer of 1578.  Mendoza’s intelligence 
is a valuable source but must be used carefully; it contains remarkably accurate observations 
alongside obvious misinformation.  By May 8, 1578, he already knew that Gilbert was collecting 
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ships “to go rob your Majesty’s Indies route.”46  Mendoza was particularly concerned to report 
that Gilbert was making “every effort to take with him a man well-versed in the navigation and 
language of that place, who is of the nation of Chaldeans, who is here [in England].”47      
By early June, Mendoza’s vague description had solidified into solid intelligence on the 
identity of this man:  
They are taking with them one Simon Fernandez, a Portuguese – a grand scoundrel – who 
has given and continues to give them much information about that coast, of which he is 
well-versed, and to the King of Portugal – as I am told – he has done no little damage 
owing to the losses suffered in this kingdom by his subjects through this man, and when 
Champagni was here it was arranged with the Earl of Leicester in his own room – where 
the queen was – that the way to insure themselves against your Majesty and to cut your 
bountiful good fortune was to go to the Indies route and rob the fleets, unless they could 
establish a footing on the coast, for in this they would prevent so much money coming to 
your Majesty….48 
 
In this instance, Mendoza’s report is remarkably accurate.  This is the Simão Fernandes 
previously discussed as an associate of John Callis in English Channel piracy and saved from the 
gallows by Sir Francis Walsingham.  Fernandes would be referred to as “Secretary Walsinghams 
[sic] man” for the remainder of his English service.49 
 While Fernandes is remarkable for the breadth of his experience, he was only one of 
many pirates that manned Gilbert’s 1578 expedition.  Commanding three ships compared to 
Gilbert’s seven, Henry Knollys employed a large group of “notorious evill men” on his ships.50  
With such a crew, Gilbert probably thought that his mission to plunder the Spanish Atlantic 
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would provide an excellent incentive for following his orders.  In this hope, he was sorely 
disappointed.  Knollys, perhaps unsurprisingly, proved insubordinate to Gilbert’s original plan.  
His men began seizing ships along the Irish coast.51  Ambassador Mendoza seems to have 
expected such behavior in his letter of June 16, 1578 to King Philip: “It is understood that once 
they get to sea they will join together and go to the Indies route, if in Ireland or Scotland nothing 
occurs to divert them….”52  Mendoza made a prescient assessment of Gilbert’s crew before the 
expedition departed.  While Knollys sought immediate fulfillment near home, Gilbert did little 
better.  Apparently, Gilbert was content to join his associates in petty piracy, and he never made 
it near the Americas.   
The one bright spot in an otherwise complete debacle was the behavior of Gilbert’s half-
brother, Walter Ralegh, and his pilot, Simão Fernandes.  They left England ahead of the other 
ships in the Falcon and loitered in the Cape Verde Islands, waiting for the other ships to arrive 
before sailing further.  When the rest of the expedition did not appear, they apparently sought 
plunder in the region before returning home by May.53  Still, all was not well, and William 
Hawkins, the Falcon’s owner, brought Gilbert before the High Court of Chancery, apparently 
because of wasted supplies for which Gilbert claimed no responsibility.  Fernandes and Ralegh 
were examined by the court, and their deposition illustrates their close working relationship in 
outfitting the Falcon for the expedition.  The roughly forty-year-old Azorean and the twenty-six 
year old Englishman answered the questions presented them with detail as to their preparations, 
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and Ralegh seemed to understand that his half-brother departed from his course on account of 
“theires that were in his company.”54 
 The Privy Council responded swiftly to Gilbert’s apparent dereliction of duty, revoking 
his rights to establish overseas colonies on April 26, 1579, unless he paid sureties for his future 
expedition’s good behavior.55  His proposals to the queen in 1577 asked for her cooperation in 
hiding his acts of piracy against the Spanish crown, but the fulfillment of this scheme in 1578 
suffered terribly from disorganization.  Rather than crippling Spain’s overseas empire through 
state-sanctioned piracy, Gilbert’s botched venture only managed to irritate local shipping around 
the British Isles.  Such petty theft was no fulfillment of Elizabeth’s larger strategic aims against 
Spain, and it challenged her faith in Gilbert’s ability to complete the task at hand.    
 In the years following his failed expedition in 1578, Gilbert’s plans for a North American 
colony proceeded in fits and starts.  He did, however, support an important reconnaissance 
expedition in the spring of 1580 in keeping with the queen’s earlier directive in his colonial 
patent.56  Gilbert sent the Squirrel, under the command of Simão Fernandes, to the modern New 
England coast.  The bond of £500 Gilbert entered for the ship’s good behavior attests to his 
fallen reputation after his indiscriminate piracy.57  Fernandes sailed to America and back to 
England in just three months, an excellent feat of seamanship and probably the result of highly 
favorable winds.  Fernandes’s short visit still yielded intelligence regarding the housing of the 
native peoples of the region, and the expedition also returned bearing large animal skins from the 
area.  Immediately after his return, Fernandes visited John Dee, providing him with a map of the 
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east coast of North America.58  This was the last service Fernandes rendered to Gilbert, probably 
because his patron, Sir Francis Walsingham, had begun to doubt Gilbert’s ability to carry the 
English overseas enterprise forward.  Fernandes is a barometer of the interests of the anti-
Spanish party of the queen’s inner circle.  He served in many capacities throughout his career, 
but the common thread among them all was a consistent urge toward plundering the Spanish 
Empire.   
 While Gilbert struggled to prepare for his next expedition, Fernandes served as a pilot on 
Edward Fenton’s voyage to the South Sea.  This important mission was bankrolled by Robert 
Dudley, the Earl of Leicester, and sought to capitalize on the relationship built between Sir 
Francis Drake and the people of the Moluccas in the East Indies.59  This expensive expedition, 
composed of four ships and about 250 men, accomplished nothing of importance and only 
surpassed Gilbert’s 1578 expedition in the number of miles it traveled.60  Fenton served 
previously in Ireland and as Martin Frobisher’s lieutenant to Meta Incognita, but he proved 
inadequate for the task of leading a large crew of seamen on a long, serious expedition.61  As 
soon as Fenton’s ships left the English Channel, it became apparent to Richard Madox, the 
Galleon Leicester’s chaplain, that “they wer al withowt pytty set upon the spoyl.”62  Apparently, 
the sailors on the expedition spoke highly of trade while ashore to procure investment from the 
merchant community, but made clear their piratical intentions once at sea.  The expedition sailed 
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as far as St. Vincent on the South American coast before disintegrating and returning to England 
in disgrace. 
 Madox’s impressive diary of the voyage paints a lively picture of Fernandes and the 
priorities of early English trading voyages.  To Madox, Fernandes was “the source of all evil” 
and “a ravenows theef.”63  John Walker, another chaplain, echoed Madox and complained to 
Fenton about Fernandes’s speech that was “offensyve to God, and nothinge chrystyanlyke, for 
that he rejoysed in thinges starke naughtey, bragginge in his sondrye pyracyes.”64  During the 
voyage, the expedition was forced to rely on the Azorean and his fellow pilot, Thomas Hood, 
who sailed only to acquire Spanish plunder.  According to Madox, “Fernando sayld a month on 
dry land.”65  This feeling of being hostage to the whims of pirate pilots haunted John White in 
his expedition to Roanoke Island in 1587.  When Madox confronted Fernandes about his 
hostility to the Spanish, nominally at peace with England, Fernandes said, “a license has been 
granted to me by five privy councilors to wage war against the Spaniards.”66  The pilot likely 
told the truth; he retained the Privy Council’s confidence long after Fenton’s voyage 
disintegrated through piracy.  Fernandes was doing Walsingham’s bidding: plundering the 
wealth of Spain. 
This view of Fernandes as a sign of the anti-Spanish faction’s blessing is confirmed in the 
aims of Gilbert’s colonial enterprise that would eventually sail in 1583.  As Gilbert prepared to 
send another expedition in 1581 and 1582, it is apparent that a landed settlement had become his 
chief aim.  Far from his proposal to simply “annoy the kyng of Spayne,” Gilbert appears to have 
embraced his colonial patent for its own sake, not as a simple pretense for piracy.  He 
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coordinated his efforts with Sir George Peckham and Sir Thomas Gerard, English Catholics 
eager to secure a colony for their co-religionists who feared increasing levels of persecution as 
Anglicanism continued to solidify its identity in England.  In all, Gilbert subleased the rights to 
over eight million acres of land in North America to fund his colonial enterprise.67 
 Gilbert’s plans for his colony exemplify the most conservative, traditionalist elements of 
contemporary English society.  England was quickly modernizing and leaving behind its feudal 
heritage, but Gilbert’s scheme proposed to create a neo-feudal society in America.  Gilbert 
served, under the queen’s nominal authority, as a grand landlord of the entirety of his massive 
North American claim.  His vision, detailed in his grant of authority to Sir John Gilbert, Sir 
George Peckham, and William Aucher, was detailed, if rather idealistic.  The project would 
become self-sufficient in due time as his large landholding grantees induced further settlers to 
rent the land from them.68  Gilbert foresaw Anglican clergymen creating new bishoprics in the 
land alongside their Catholic neighbors in an apparent plan for religious toleration, the first such 
vision for English America.69  Each successive rung on the steeply hierarchical ladder of 
settlement for the colony would pay ever decreasing rents for their tenancy on the land after 
seven years of settlement, by which time the land should be settled enough to produce its rents.  
Even England’s roaming poor had a chance to partake in the new society if they could provide 
some seed and tools with which to farm.  Grantees were also encouraged to transport servants 
with them in order to gain access to larger landholdings, an important precedent that later 
induced Englishmen to bring millions of indentured servants and slaves to the Americas in 
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succeeding centuries.70  Gilbert’s share was to be two-fifths of the colony’s net income so that he 
could pay the queen her fifth as required in his colonial patent and retain the other fifth for his 
personal use.71 
 In 1582, Gilbert continued the arduous task of organizing his colonial expedition.  Given 
the failure of his previous overseas enterprise, he was eager to prove himself worthy of 
Elizabeth’s confidence.  He actively interviewed many people with experience in the Americas 
and those who possessed extensive knowledge by association.  Among these were David Ingram, 
a man who claimed to have walked the three thousand miles from the Gulf of Mexico to Cape 
Breton, and John Dee, the English polymath with considerable cartographical knowledge of the 
Americas.72  A set of instructions for a 1582 reconnaissance expedition to Norumbega – a 
nebulous region roughly corresponding to modern New England – also attest to Gilbert’s 
extensive preparations and his intentions for a landed colony.  The unknown author advised the 
expedition’s master to seek the most defensible position on navigable rivers.  The instructions 
held hope for the possibility of trade in the South Sea “by fresh ryvers and lakes whereby no 
prince can possibly impeache your traffique.”73  It does not appear that such a reconnaissance 
expedition ever occurred, but its directives contribute to a substantial body of evidence that 
suggests Gilbert’s fastidiousness in preparing for his final colonial enterprise. 
 Despite Gilbert’s best efforts, he struggled to cobble together a viable expedition.  When 
Spanish Ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza discovered Gilbert’s plan to plant English 
Catholics in America, he quickly moved to squash the plan.  This represented a real threat to the 
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Spanish Crown’s hopes to use propaganda among England’s numerous Catholics to destabilize 
the queen and her Anglican Church.  Mendoza warned the Catholics that their actions would be 
in direct contradiction of papal decree and that they would be killed alongside any other 
Englishmen settling within Spanish Florida.74  Mendoza’s scare tactics combined with large 
financial barriers placed by the Privy Council to crush Catholic involvement in Gilbert’s project.  
By 1583, most of the Catholic gentry abandoned him.  Gilbert’s efforts were also stymied by 
issues with capitalizing his project.  The port of Southampton was awarded exclusive 
commercial rights under his patent, and his subscribers principally came from this area.75  Gilbert 
only raised about £1000 from the merchant community of Southampton, relying on a small 
group of large-scale investors, like Ralegh, for the majority of the expedition’s capital.76  Such a 
structure proved unable to support sustained investment, both in Gilbert’s attempts to establish 
settlements and Ralegh’s own attempts later in the decade.   
Secretary Walsingham’s behavior during Gilbert’s preparations in 1582 was particularly 
curious.  Walsingham and his step-son, Christopher Carleill, tried to organize their own 
American expedition in 1582 by tapping into the resources of England’s wealthiest western port, 
Bristol.77  This move violated Southampton’s monopoly on American trade.  Furthermore, 
Carleill and Walsingham contacted the Muscovy Company for financial assistance in their 
scheme.  Gilbert intentionally avoided engaging the company in his plans, probably due to their 
unfavorable reaction to his 1567 request for trading rights in Asia.78  Historian David Beers 
Quinn floated several explanations for this strange arrangement and believed the simplest 
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inference from the evidence was that Walsingham was attempting to undercut Gilbert’s actions 
in America.79  This is possible, given his decision to remove Fernandes from the enterprise, but 
unlikely in light of more recent documentary discoveries.  Quinn changed his opinion due to new 
evidence in the form of some letters discovered in a private collection in the 1960s.  It seems 
more likely that Walsingham wanted to use his connections in Bristol and the Muscovy 
Company to help secure a secondary expedition to follow shortly after Gilbert’s departure in 
1583.  This interpretation is bolstered by a letter from Maurice Browne, an important participant 
in the 1583 expedition, who claims that Carleill’s expedition, composed of “divers of the cheife 
marchauntes of London, and the marchauntes of Bristowe dooe joyne in consort, and doth send 
fyve sayle more of good shipes with provision and men to Sir Humfrey….”80 Although such an 
action would be illegal under the terms of Gilbert’s patent, Walsingham always wielded his 
immense power on the fringes of the law by supporting numerous spies throughout the 
Continent, shamelessly unleashing English pirates upon the Spanish, and seeking outside funds 
for colonial ventures he believed necessary but illegal.  Future colonies proved the wisdom of 
organizing swift relief in the hostile Americas.  In the end, Walsingham’s plan came to naught, 
and Gilbert had to rely solely on the unimpressive investment of the Southampton merchant 
community, a group of financially challenged Catholics, and the monumental investments of a 
small group of English gentlemen. 
Gilbert continued his preparations through the early months of 1583, facing many delays 
and false starts.  He finally sailed in June with five vessels and plans to go directly across the 
North Atlantic to Newfoundland rather than following the normal procedure of sailing south to 
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the West Indies before coasting north on the Gulf Stream.  The voyage followed this unusual 
course because of a lack of victuals.  This issue plagued the entirety of the expedition; the Bark 
Raleigh, which was the expedition’s largest vessel, turned back for England very soon after 
sailing for this reason.81  It is likely that many of Gilbert’s prospective colonists were aboard the 
large Bark Raleigh, and that the lack of victuals quickly convinced them of the dangers of the 
remainder of the enterprise.  Quinn suggested that the project’s long delays probably wasted 
supplies as quickly as Gilbert could acquire them.82   
Although Gilbert’s 1583 venture had underwent a great deal of planning for a landed 
settlement to separate it in many ways from his piratical expedition in 1578, his final voyage still 
suffered from a culture of tolerated piracy.  One of his five vessels, the Swallow, was a pirate 
ship captained by John Callis prior to Gilbert’s departure.  When Gilbert encountered the ship, he 
set free Callis’s two French prizes and confiscated the Swallow for his own purposes.83  He 
evidently retained Callis’s crew, which was a mistake he should have avoided.  On the way to 
Newfoundland, the Swallow confiscated the victuals Gilbert failed to provide by robbing vessels 
on the way.84  Edward Hayes, the author of the most authoritative account of the voyage, spends 
the early pages of his tract highlighting the necessity of Gospel-centered behavior abroad and 
comments that, although Captain Maurice Browne was “very honest and religious, yet was he 
not appointed of men to his humor and desert: who for the most were… pirats.”85  As such, they 
found opportunity to “robbe and spoile” on their journey, treating their victims with particular 
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cruelty.86  They put ropes around the necks of their prize’s crew “with expedition (like men 
skillful in such mischiefe).”87 
Gilbert’s remaining ships rendezvoused at St. John’s Bay, an international fishing 
community of Portuguese, Spanish, Basque, English, and other fishermen.  Gilbert suggested 
raiding these peaceful fishermen in his plans from 1577, and his actions in August 1583 were 
little better.  The vessels secured the narrow entrance to the bay and sought food, water, and 
supplies from the fishing community.88  After apparently securing some victuals, the expedition 
landed on the shoreline and claimed the country within two hundred leagues in each direction for 
the queen.  The surrounding areas of Newfoundland were surveyed for future settlement, and 
Gilbert established the first three English laws for a settlement in America.  He instituted 
Anglicanism as the only acceptable form of public worship.  Clearly, he had departed from his 
plans for religious toleration when the English Catholics were more deeply involved in his 
scheme.89  He also made any interference in the queen’s sustained possession of the land high 
treason and instituted the loss of both ears for “words sounding to the dishonour of her 
Majestie.”90 
According to Hayes, the fishing community heartily assented to these laws and agreed to 
pay Gilbert taxes faithfully in the future.  These fishermen probably had considerably less 
enthusiasm for Gilbert’s intrusion into their previously collegial community than Hayes 
assumed.  The expedition proceeded south from St. John’s harbor, hoping to reach its intended 
destination of Norumbega along the modern New England coast.  The Swallow was dispatched 
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for England with many sick and famished adventurers.  Her pirate crew was transferred to the 
expedition’s flagship, the Delight, and Gilbert fortuitously relocated to the Squirrel.91  On the 
way, disaster struck when the Delight broke apart on the shallows near modern Sable Island.92  
Nearly one hundred men were lost in the wreck, including the Hungarian poet, Stephen 
Parmenius; an unnamed Saxon mineralogist; Maurice Browne, the former captain of the Swallow 
who transferred to the Delight at St. John’s Harbor; and Browne’s unruly pirates formerly on the 
Swallow.93  Gilbert’s books, notes, and charts that he made during the journey also perished in 
the wreck.94  Hayes mourned his friends’ downfalls but believed the pirates’ deaths proved that 
“Gods justice did follow the same company.”95 
With extremely limited supplies, and the loss of the expedition’s largest vessel, the 
remaining crewmen refused to proceed.  Gilbert assented, remaining positive that his colony of 
fishermen in St. John’s Bay and his reconnaissance expedition ashore would incline the queen to 
lend him £10,000 for an expedition in the spring of 1584.96  This rosy view of the queen’s favor 
is preposterous considering her hesitancy to fund other voyages without the preceding disasters 
that had racked each of Gilbert’s previous attempts.  As the expedition returned to England, 
Gilbert chose to remain in the Squirrel, overburdened as it was, refusing to relocate to the 
sturdier Golden Hind with Captain Hayes.  Apparently with More’s Utopia in hand, Gilbert 
drowned September 10, 1583, when the Squirrel disappeared beneath the waves.97 
Despite his praise of Gilbert’s noble virtues throughout his account, Hayes was frank in 
his explanation of Gilbert’s two most important shortcomings.  First and foremost, Gilbert was 
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“too prodigall of his owne patrimony” in seeking participants in an expedition to a land with no 
proven commodities.98  With no promise of financial stability, Gilbert’s recruits “made it their 
best reckoning to bee salved some other way, which pleased not God to prosper….”99  Thus the 
attractions of piracy proved irresistible on a voyage not initially intending to indulge in such 
behavior.  Secondly, Gilbert had “thrust himselfe againe into the action, for which he was not 
fit… though hee sawe no encouragement to proceed….”100  These criticisms at the end of 
Hayes’s narrative made explicit some of his subtler doubts expressed throughout his rendition of 
the 1583 expedition’s fateful experience.  For example, Hayes insinuates that Gilbert grieved 
“most of all of his bookes and notes” rather than the many men who perished in the Delight’s 
wreck.101  Hayes also stated that Gilbert “beat his boy in great rage” when he discovered that the 
boy had not rescued some ore from the Delight before he abandoned it.102  Gilbert’s fearsome 
temper from his days in Ireland seems to have persisted to the end.103  
After the failures of Gilbert’s 1578 venture, he was clearly eager to capitalize on his 
colonial patent with his 1583 expedition, but his hope for vindication led him into recklessness.  
Hayes’s penetrating observations impugn Gilbert as a poor planner and leader.  His colonial 
ambitions came to nothing, and it is tempting to omit him from the history of English 
colonization in the Americas.  Many historians have been content to pass over Gilbert in their 
quest to highlight the successes of later efforts, but this is a mistake.  Gilbert is significant as the 
first man to secure the English Crown’s confidence in planting American settlements, despite 
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other prominent Englishmen with their own dreams of overseas empire.  His plans bridged the 
sizeable gap between those Englishmen engaging in trade and plunder throughout the Atlantic 
world, and the hosts of colonial promoters that dominated the English overseas experience in the 
ensuing decades and centuries.  While his half-brother took his colonial ambitions to their logical 
ends, Englishmen in the seventeenth century revived his plans for seizing the West Indies in 
“Western Designs” to annoy the king of Spain.  
 
Chapter Four: The Roanoke Colonies: Culminations of Piratical Colonization 
 Walter Ralegh’s colonies exemplify the competing motivations and visions for English 
colonies in the late sixteenth century.  Many promoters envisioned agricultural communities 
producing commodities for European markets, an approach that eventually succeeded in 
establishing the first permanent English colony at Jamestown.  Still more promoters advocated a 
more militaristic strategy of conquest, not so different from the Spanish subjugation of Central 
America that the English rhetorically deplored.  Frobisher, Gilbert, and Fenton never established 
English settlements abroad, typically because of their intense urge for plunder.  Under Ralegh, 
however, these competing motivations and ideological assumptions would be put to the test in 
concrete settlements, comparable only with the Irish plantation schemes of the previous decades.  
Piracy became more central to Ralegh’s expeditions than to any of the previous English attempts 
at colonial settlement.  While piracy motivated the English planting at Roanoke above all else, 
the motivation of Spanish plunder also undermined the colonies at every turn.  Roanoke would 
be the stage of an Elizabethan tragedy; after all, in a span of six years, about two hundred 
Europeans -- and innumerable Native Americans -- would be lost to history. 
 With so much of the North American coast unsettled by Europeans in the 1580s, 
Ralegh’s choosing the Outer Banks as the destination for his first colony demands some 
explanation.  The primary attraction of the area was its promise of seclusion and protection due 
to its long, protective shoals.  In the climate of piracy that was becoming more mainstream at an 
alarming rate to England’s enemies, the inland sounds of the Outer Banks seemed an optimal 
haven for pirates and privateers as they prowled the Gulf Stream waters for the Spanish flotas 
bound for Spain.  Some promoters, like the younger Richard Hakluyt, assumed that the region 
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would have a Mediterranean climate since its latitude was near that of Spain and Italy.1  With 
hostilities between England and Spain on the rise, Mediterranean products were more difficult to 
procure through trade, but the promoters hoped that an American colony could fill the gap.  The 
real climate of the region came as a shock to the Englishmen with its hot summers and cool 
winters. 
Simão Fernandes also played a large role in Ralegh’s decision to locate his colony on the 
Outer Banks.  If the testimony of a Spanish pilot formerly held in English captivity may be 
trusted, the Azorean Fernandes “induced them to settle there.”2  Surprisingly, a foreigner played 
a key role in the beginnings of English colonization, but Fernandes had the most developed 
knowledge and experience of eastern North America among those in English service.  His 
knowledge of the Spanish settlement at Santa Elena and the butchered Jesuit mission on the 
Chesapeake Bay, coupled with his probable familiarity with the Chicora Legend that initially 
drew the Spanish into the Southeast, made the Outer Banks an attractively unexploited place for 
settlement.3  Contemporary maps also frequently showed Verrazano’s Sea dipping tantalizingly 
close to the coast, since the Italian navigator mistook Pamlico Sound for the Pacific in his 1524 
voyage.4  With claims to the supposed Northwest Passage far from surrendered after Frobisher’s 
failures, the region apparently had much to offer.  Unfortunately for those Englishmen who 
settled there, the Outer Banks offered none of the benefits for which they hazarded their lives.                  
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On April 27, 1584, two barks departed England for the New World, looking to capitalize 
on Walter Ralegh’s patent to “fynde out and viewe such remote heathen and barbarous landes.”5  
Ralegh’s star rose considerably in the queen’s favor in the early 1580s, and his half-brother’s 
sudden death in 1583 rendered him the leader of the colonial promoters at court.  Ralegh’s patent 
provided him authority to “buylde and fortifye” settlements of people bearing the “pryvyledges 
of free Denizens and persons natyve of England.”6  Philip Amadas and Arthur Barlowe led the 
expedition south to the Canary Islands and then to the West Indies.  After victualling in the 
Bahamas for one week, the expedition continued north along the east coast of North America, 
which Barlowe said “smelt so sweetely… as if… in the midst of some delicate garden.”7  The 
party entered Roanoke Sound “not without some difficultie” near modern Oregon Inlet, at Port 
Ferdinando, so named for the expedition’s Azorean pilot, Simão Fernandes.8  The difficulty of 
navigating the treacherous shoals and shallow waters of the Outer Banks should have portended 
the difficulties the future colonies would face, but the English remained enraptured by their 
Edenic surroundings. The men disembarked on Hatteras Island, and claimed the land for their 
queen under the provisions of Ralegh’s patent.9  
 Soon after arriving, the Englishmen had their first encounter with the region’s indigenous 
people.  The two parties quickly began trading with one another, the Englishmen trading clothes 
and trinkets for the natives’ animal skins.  The leader of the local party was Granganimeo, whose 
brother, Wingina, was the leader of the Secotan Indians.  Wingina was wounded, having taken 
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two arrows in a recent skirmish with neighboring tribes.10  The English were invading an area 
already embroiled in conflict.  Granganimeo led the exploring party to his home on Roanoke 
Island.  The Roanokes received the Englishmen “with all love and kindness.”11  Granganimeo’s 
wife cooked vegetables for the party and offered her home for their lodging.  The Englishmen 
refused, preferring the safety of their pinnace to spending the night in the foreign home.12  After 
assessing the region for several days, the explorers returned to England with Wanchese and 
Manteo, two Indians from the area.  By October 1584, the pair were causing a stir in London 
because of their foreign dress, and Thomas Hariot was “specially employed” learning their 
Algonquian language.13   
Richard Hakluyt also presented his Discourse of Western Planting to the queen late in 
1584, highlighting the “greate necessitie” of establishing English plantations overseas.14  
Hakluyt’s sophisticated twenty-one-point argument for English overseas expansion combined 
evangelical, commercial, military, and societal concerns in its plea to the queen for state 
sponsorship of colonial ventures.  Informed by years of studying other European travel accounts 
and colonial experiences, Hakluyt argued that English colonies would bring the heathen to 
Christianity, reduce the masses of jobless sluggards in London, create new markets for 
commodities, and base squadrons of state-sponsored sea dogs to nobly plunder the Spanish 
treasure fleets.  Hakluyt hoped his Discourse would inspire Elizabeth to support the venture with 
state funds; in this aim, he was unsuccessful.  The queen’s reticence is understandable in light of 
the embarrassment of Martin Frobisher’s enterprises and the total failures of Gilbert’s various 
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voyages.  Indeed, there was little reason to expect success in 1584 when Hakluyt’s argument was 
presented to the queen.  Given Hakluyt’s failure to inspire state sponsorship of Ralegh’s voyages, 
historians have traditionally discounted the Discourse’s importance in the development of 
English colonial theory, despite its impressive collection of available contemporary knowledge.15  
The striking ways in which Ralegh’s colonies at Roanoke reflected Hakluyt’s arguments in the 
Discourse of Western Planting strongly suggest otherwise.             
As preparations for the upcoming colonial voyage carried into 1585, the deteriorating 
diplomatic relationship between England and Spain hardened into open warfare in the Atlantic.  
The Spanish ambassador, Bernardino de Mendoza, was expelled from England in 1584 for his 
involvement in the Throckmorton Plot to assassinate Queen Elizabeth.16  English piracy against 
Spanish merchant vessels received little condemnation from the queen, with no signs of change.  
All of this compounded the religious hostility between the two nations that had been simmering 
for several decades by the 1580s.  Thus, with a war beginning that eventually threatened 
England’s security and autonomy, Sir Walter Ralegh began the arduous task of organizing the 
first English colony in America. 
Ralegh’s first colonial effort reflected the tumultuous times of its inception.  While 
Barlowe’s 1584 account focuses heavily on the agricultural promise of the land with its “divers 
kindes of fruites, Melons, Walnuts, Cucumbers, Gourdes… and Countrey corne,” the 1585 
colony became a military base for warfare against the Spanish, with commercial concerns 
occupying an important secondary place in the adventurers’ minds.17  A fundamental change 
occurred in the orientation of the colony in a very short period of time.  This shift owed itself to 
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the deepening hostilities with Spain at the most important moment and to Richard Hakluyt’s 
recommendations in his Discourse.  Queen Elizabeth’s intervention in the colony’s preparations 
bears witness to the importance of the 1585 colony in England’s strategic position vis-à-vis 
Spain.  In February 1585, she recalled Ralph Lane from military service in Ireland and proceeded 
to pay his salary as a member of Ralegh’s expedition.18  Lane was no merchant, gentleman, 
mineralogist, or any other type of man commonly associated with other English colonial 
enterprises; rather, he was an expert in fortifications who had been employed in the security of 
English plantations in Ireland.19  Paid by the queen herself, and a chief interest of Secretary 
Walsingham, Lane provided the military expertise necessary to make the Roanoke Colony an 
effective part of the Anglo-Spanish War.  In Hakluyt’s Discourse, “men experte in the arte of 
fortification” were the first named in his list of necessary professionals for western plantations.20  
The queen had listened. 
Lane was not the only member of Walsingham’s inner circle to participate in the 1585 
venture.  Simão Fernandes, “Secretary Walsingham’s man,” was to serve as the pilot of the 
Tiger, the expedition’s flagship.21  As Lane brought landed military experience to the venture, 
Fernandes represented the real impetus of the war itself: state-sanctioned piracy of Spanish 
vessels at sea.  Fernandes shifted from Gilbert’s service in 1582, probably at the request of 
Walsingham himself, since he was more interested in the Fenton expedition to the South Sea.  
Having served well with Ralegh on Gilbert’s otherwise troublesome 1578 expedition, Fernandes 
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was a good fit for the Roanoke ventures.  He served on each of the major expeditions to Roanoke 
in 1584, 1585, and 1587. 
John White and Thomas Hariot were also important members of the 1585 colony.  
White’s watercolors, painted during the expedition, are artistic treasures as early European 
perspectives on North America.  He likely accompanied Martin Frobisher to the Northwest in 
1577, and he also traveled to Virginia with the reconnaissance expedition in 1584.22  He traveled 
to Roanoke as the expedition’s official artist in 1585, painting forts, animals, natives, and 
villages along the way.  As White reported artistically on the New World, Hariot recorded the 
scientific wonders of America and its inhabitants.  He highlighted the flora and fauna of the 
region alongside his ethnology of the area’s indigenous peoples in his report to Ralegh, now 
known as A Briefe and True Report of the Newfound Land of Virginia.23  Employing these two 
men to record the natural wealth and existing human cultures of eastern North America stands as 
one of Ralegh’s wisest decisions relating to his expeditions. 
Ralegh’s ships left Plymouth in April 1585 under the command of Sir Richard Grenville, 
an experienced seaman and a veteran of the Irish conquest who saw his own colonial proposal to 
visit “Terra Australis” in the South Sea denied by the queen in 1574.24  Over a decade after this 
disappointment to his colonial ambitions, he received an opportunity to serve as the general and 
admiral of Ralegh’s immense expedition of roughly six hundred men and eight seagoing 
vessels.25  Grenville and Lane sailed on the Tiger, a three-masted ship of roughly 150 tons that 
the queen lent as the expedition’s flagship.26  Well-armed with about twelve cannons, the Tiger 
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looked to compel surrenders from possible prize-ships on the journey, allowing the two smaller 
pinnaces to close and seize the vessels.27  John Clarke, a companion of the notorious pirate, John 
Callice, captained the Roebuck and apparently took a French prize bearing Spanish goods while 
waiting for the remaining ships to assemble in Plymouth.28   
The fleet left England and sailed south, taking a Spanish fishing vessel bound for 
Newfoundland soon after departure.29  A storm dispersed the fleet off the coast of Portugal, 
forcing the ships to proceed to the West Indies in isolated groups.30  The ships arrived piecemeal 
at Puerto Rico, where they planned to replenish stores spent in the crossing.  Grenville and Lane 
arrived first in the Tiger and began building a temporary fort at Guayanilla Bay to defend their 
men who were busy building a new pinnace to replace one that sank off Portugal.31  When the 
pinnace was built, Lane and Grenville abandoned the fort under the perceived threat of an 
imminent Spanish attack and searched for plunder in the area.  They took two Spanish ships, one 
containing numerous goods bound for San Juan that were beneficial to the English expedition.  
Lane took command of the prize and sailed to Salinas Bay, Puerto Rico to take two mounds of 
salt near Cape Rojo.32  Lane skillfully constructed earthworks around the site to protect the 
captive Spanish crewmen laboring to remove the salt, immortalized in one of John White’s 
watercolors from the voyage.33   
After a few of the other ships rendezvoused with the Tiger, the expedition proceeded to 
Hispaniola.  The English spent a week with the Spanish governor of Isabella on the north coast 
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of Hispaniola, ignoring the state of warfare between the two countries.34  Simão Fernandes likely 
led the expedition to this location because of a French acquaintance called “Alanson,” mentioned 
in 1587, who traded in the region.35  Clearly, these Spaniards were no strangers to foreign trade.  
The “English Generall and the Spanish Governor discoursed betwixt them of divers matters” and 
the Englishmen “provided two banquetting houses… one for the gentlemen, the other for the 
servants.”36  A scene of mirth continued as “a sumptuous banquet was brought… with the sound 
of trumpets, and consort of musick, wherewith the Spanyards were more than delighted.”37  The 
English traded their prize goods for horses and cattle for the colony and for goods to be sold in 
England.38  Truly, many members of the Atlantic community had little interest in the conflict 
between Spain and England. 
Leaving Hispaniola and navigating the Bahamas, the expedition sighted the North 
American coast on June 20, nearly wrecking on the Cape Fear on June 23.  The expedition 
sought to penetrate the Outer Banks at an inlet called Wococon, near modern Ocracoke and 
Portsmouth Islands.39  The Tiger’s draft was too deep, causing it to ground and face the fury of 
the rough waves.  The 1584 expedition breached the Outer Banks “not without some difficultie,” 
but their warning that should have raised serious doubts about Roanoke’s prospects as a pirate 
haven was ignored because it was inconvenient to the preferred strategy against Spain.40 
At this point, serious fault lines become apparent in the accounts of the 1585 venture.  
One anonymous journalist blamed “the unskilfulnesse of the Master whose name was Fernando” 
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for the Tiger’s mishap.41  Ralph Lane, on the other hand, wrote Sir Francis Walsingham shortly 
after disembarking on the Outer Banks, praising “the master and Pylotte maggiore of our Fleete 
your honors servante Symon FerdyNando who trewly hathe carryed him selfe bothe with greate 
skylle and grete governement all thys voyeage” as the “masteres and marryners wyll with one 
voyce affyrme.”42  In another letter, written in September 1585, Lane tells Walsingham that 
Grenville “hathe demeaned him selfe, from the first daye of hys entry into governement at 
Plymmouth….”43  Evidently, Grenville had threatened Lane’s life over advice the latter had 
volunteered to him.44  Lane completed his assessment by stating that he “had soo muche 
experyence of hys government…humbelly to desyre… to bee freedde from (the) place where sir 
Richard Greenefeelde ys to carry eny authorytye in chyeffe.”45           
 In such an environment of division, difficult decisions had to be made.  The loss of the 
Tiger’s supplies was a major blow to the security of the colony since it would take considerable 
time to grow sufficient food for the large group, especially since the English were largely 
ignorant of the area’s growing seasons.  Sir Richard Grenville decided to return to England in 
order to secure relief for the colony, departing on August 25.  Many of the men returned with 
him, leaving only 108 men under Lane’s command to establish England’s first American colony.  
On the voyage to England, Grenville took the most lucrative prize of the Roanoke ventures, the 
Santa Maria of San Vicente.  Spanish reports valued the ship at about £48,000, laden as it was 
with pearls, ivory, gold, and silver.46  In contrast, Grenville reported the prize’s value to Sir 
Francis Walsingham as being about £15,000 with no mention of several of the commodities the 
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Spanish claimed were onboard.47  The evidence suggests that Grenville was trying to maximize 
his profits at the expense of the state’s one-fifth claim to any reported profits.  Nevertheless, 
Kenneth R. Andrews argued that the value of the prize fully-covered the 1585 expedition’s 
expenses.48  This was a powerful statement to those promoters of funding overseas expansion 
through plunder and ensured piracy’s continued presence on all major voyages to Roanoke. 
Before settling on a permanent site for the settlement, the expedition explored the 
mainland coast of Pamlico Sound and visited several Indian villages.  They toured Pomeioc, a 
palisaded village of about eighteen longhouses near Wysocking Bay; Aquascogoc, further to the 
west near modern Belhaven; and Secotan, still further west on the Pamlico River.49  At least 
some of the party also traveled the short distance inland to Lake Paquipe, now known as Lake 
Mattamuskeet.  These encounters provided John White with the opportunity to paint his best-
known watercolors of Algonquian Indian villages and people before the ravages of European 
diseases and weapons destroyed them.  During this important time in which peaceful 
cohabitation seemed possible, an important act of barbarism was committed by the explorers that 
shook any perceptions of fair-dealing the Indians may have had from the English:  “We returned 
thence, and one of our boates with the Admirall [Arthur Barlowe] was sent to Aquacococke to 
demaund a silver cup which one of the Savages had stolen from us, and not receiving it 
according to his promise, we burnt, and spoyled their corne, and Towne, all the people beeing 
fledde.”50  When in doubt, the English resorted to intimidation in their dealings with the Indians, 
to the ruin of all parties involved. 
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While Grenville enriched himself at sea, Ralph Lane, relieved to be rid of the general 
whose leadership he had come to detest, began the difficult task of leading the first English 
colony in America.  The details known about the beginnings of the colony are minimal; Lane’s 
narrative of the colony’s history only covers the last few months of Roanoke’s occupation, but 
there are important clues that emerge from his early letters to Walsingham and the surviving 
works of John White and Thomas Hariot.  Importantly, some men journeyed to the Chesapeake 
Bay and wintered with the Indians there on the south shore.  This is evident from White’s 
detailed map of the region and Lane’s cryptic references to such an expedition in his report given 
upon the colony’s return home.51  The sparsity of Lane’s description of the region is probably 
due to Ralegh’s editing of the account before Richard Hakluyt published it in 1589.  He rightly 
feared the prying eyes of the Spanish.  Hariot’s Briefe and True Report indicates strongly that he 
made the journey north to the bay.52  
The fortifications built in Virginia were among the most pressing items on Lane’s agenda 
for establishing the colony, but they remain poorly understood by historians.  These structures 
are the most likely to still remain visible in the twenty-first century, but historians remain divided 
in their assessments of the documentary and archaeological record that could give clues as to 
their location.  Lane’s first fort in Virginia occupied a point of land separating Port Lane and Port 
Ferdinando, due east of Roanoke Island.  Although historian David Beers Quinn did not believe 
any fortification was erected there, Lane himself claimed that “the lande being fortefyed with a 
skonse, yt ys not to be enterdde by all the force (that) Spayne canne make.”53  Keeping in mind 
the rapid pace with which Lane had built his forts in the Caribbean, such a bold pronouncement 
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suggests that a formidable structure had already been raised near Port Ferdinando even before 
Grenville departed for England.  Furthermore, Spanish ships searching for the English settlement 
found a great deal of debris in 1588 from English occupation of the area, including two barrels 
for catching rain water, presumably to supply the garrison stationed there during Lane’s tenure at 
Roanoke.54 
While the inlet fort guarded the area from a much-feared Spanish attack, Lane also led 
the construction of the main settlement for the 108 military men under his care.  The prominent 
men lived in two-story dwellings, while barracks were probably built for the rest of the military 
men.55  The expedition promptly constructed a forge, just as it had in Puerto Rico, for making 
nails, hinges, and other necessary items.56  There was also a storehouse for the expedition’s 
limited provisions under the care of Richard Butler, a cape merchant.57  Even such a bare outline 
of the buildings necessary to house a settlement of over one hundred people easily disqualifies 
the existing Fort Raleigh site on Roanoke Island as the colony’s primary fort.  After all, Lane’s 
fort at Guayanilla Bay measured approximately 1150 feet by 950 feet and was erected in less 
than 10 days.58  Surely a site of comparable size was erected on Roanoke Island during Lane’s 
nearly one year of occupation. 
In his apologia written to defend his failed colony, Lane described his explorations 
“within the mayne” and outlined his plan to relocate the colony if he had received resupply in a 
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timely manner.59  Having sent a party to explore the Chesapeake Bay during the winter of 1585 
and hearing of that region’s wealth from the nearby Choanoke Indians, he proposed sending an 
expedition to build “a sconse with a small trench, and a pallisado upon the top of it” at the 
headwaters of the Chowan River.60  From there, the expedition would proceed north two days 
and build “another sconse according to the former… upon some corne fielde.”61  Another two 
days’ journey would land his expedition on the Chesapeake Bay, where he “would have raised a 
mayne forte, both for the defence of the harboroughs, and our shipping also, and would have 
reduced our whole habitation from Roanoke and from the harborough and port there (which by 
proofe is very naught)….”62  This journey “within the mayne” would have only been about fifty 
miles overland by the route described, and Lane’s implications to Ralegh were clear: the 
Chesapeake Bay possessed those features necessary for a successful colony.63 
While Lane planned his escape from Roanoke, relations with the local Indian population 
continued to deteriorate.  The colonists relied heavily on Indian corn, and the locals hardly had 
enough to feed themselves during the drought prevailing at the time.  Word of the colonists’ 
habit of stealing corn spread throughout the area, so that when Lane took a party up the Roanoke 
River in his search for copper mines, the Indians abandoned their riverside villages and took their 
food stores with them.64  Lane also became a pawn in the hands of his Indian neighbors as the 
rival Chowan and Roanoke Indians sought to use the Englishmen to their own advantage.  In this 
way, Menatonon, the Chowan chief, convinced Lane of an impending Roanoke attack against the 
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colonists on the island.65  The Roanoke chief, formerly called Wingina, had changed his name to 
Pemisapan, and Menatonon warned Lane of impending doom through his son Skiko, who was 
living among the English.  Convinced by Skiko’s words, Lane made a preemptive strike against 
the Roanokes.  The English beheaded Pemisapan in the skirmish, and killed several other 
Roanoke Indians.  This climactic act of violence intimidated the local Indians for some time, 
signaling the end of any hopes for peaceful English colonization at Roanoke Island. 
Under such dire conditions, Edward Stafford was filled with genuine terror upon sighting 
a massive fleet of twenty-three ships approaching modern Cape Hatteras on June 8, 1586.66  
However, his fears of Spanish annihilation were dispelled when he discovered that it was Sir 
Francis Drake’s fleet returning from its sweeping attack on the Spanish Caribbean.  Drake’s 
activities during the expedition bear witness to his vested interest in Roanoke’s success: he 
sacked San Agustín to protect Roanoke and stripped the Spanish outpost of every item that might 
prove useful for the colonists.67  He was disappointed by the situation at Roanoke.  The colonists 
did not have food or sufficient clothing, and their relations with the local Indians were shattered.  
Most importantly, Drake was forced to anchor “in the road of our bad harborough,” Port 
Ferdinando.68  Despite Roanoke’s failings for his own purposes, Drake proved himself a friend 
of the colonial scheme, offering his seventy ton Francis and one month’s provisions for one 
hundred men.  This decision echoed John Hawkins’s similar offer to the French colony of La 
Caroline twenty years earlier when Drake made his first voyage to the West Indies.  Drake 
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probably hoped the Francis would help the colony quickly relocate to the Chesapeake, and fulfill 
his hopes for a pirate base.  Nature itself seemed to conspire against his benevolence: a hurricane 
ravaged the fleet for four days and sank the Francis.  With this final blow to the colony’s dim 
hopes, Lane hurriedly ferried his men onto Drake’s ships to return to England.  Ralegh’s first 
colony had failed. 
Only a few days after the abandonment of Roanoke, Ralegh’s long overdue relief ship 
arrived on the Outer Banks.  Finding the area abandoned, it left for England.69  Two weeks later, 
Sir Richard Grenville arrived with a sizable relief force.  After learning of Lane’s departure from 
a Roanoke Indian, he foolishly left only fifteen men to hold the settlement site.70  With his large 
crew still intact, Grenville sought plunder across the Atlantic and took a few small prizes before 
returning to England in December.71 
Ralegh’s thoughts regarding Roanoke’s abandonment are not recorded, but his plans for 
future settlement in 1587 bear witness to some things he learned from Lane’s report.  Ralegh was 
undoubtedly disappointed by his lost investment in the colony, but probably held hope that 
Grenville’s small party could maintain the English claim to the Outer Banks.  Although Lane’s 
failures at Roanoke made him blameworthy for some of the colony’s shortcomings, Ralegh 
himself probably felt guilty for the colony’s failure.  After all, he had failed to supply his colony 
by Easter 1586 as expected, not because he could not afford to do so, but because such an 
expedition under Bernard Drake was diverted by the queen away from Roanoke to 
Newfoundland on a privateering voyage.72  His focus turned to highly profitable plunder cruises 
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during this early stage of the sea war with Spain, and he was slow to organize another relief 
expedition.   
Despite his disappointments, Ralegh’s faith in Virginia’s viability for an English 
settlement remained unsullied.  Shortly after Lane’s return, he organized another colony to settle 
on the Chesapeake Bay, according to Lane’s earlier plan.  His second colony would be 
substantively different from the militaristic colony founded in 1585 and more similar to Gilbert’s 
manorial schemes for Norumbega.  Male and female settlers – not soldiers – would pay their way 
to America and receive five hundred acres of land in Virginia.73  In sixteenth century England, 
property ownership on such a scale was unattainable for all but the wealthiest Englishmen.  The 
sparse evidence relating to the 118 colonists who departed for Virginia in 1587 suggests that 
most of them were of middle-class stock in London and the West Country.74  For such a group, 
five hundred acres of land must have been an incredibly attractive lure.  John White would be 
their governor, alongside twelve assistants, heavily invested in the venture, who would serve as 
an executive council.75 
The history of the 1587 colony must be primarily reconstructed using John White’s 
narrative account of the expedition.  As with Lane’s account of his colony, this perspective is 
problematic, especially since White’s account contains a singular antagonist upon whom all 
difficulties are blamed.  After the expedition left Plymouth, White claims that Simão Fernandes, 
the master of the fleet, “lewdly forsooke” the expedition’s flyboat off the coast of Portugal.76  
The fleet swung through the West Indies in typical fashion, but White’s attempts to supply his 
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colony were frustrated at every turn.  White blamed Fernandes for each mishap.  While on the 
modern island of St. Croix searching for fresh water, White found Indian pottery, despite 
Fernandes’s claim that the island was uninhabited.  Later, White claimed that Fernandes “began 
to sweare, and teare God in peeces” when he intentionally brought the Lion into shallow waters 
to frustrate the expedition’s plans to search for salt.77  Fernandes told White that he planned to 
visit Hispaniola, as the 1585 colonists had done, but sailed past it without delay.78  When 
Fernandes finally allowed the fleet to disembark for salt in the Caicos, White curiously writes 
that he “solaced himself a shoare, with one of the company” while the others worked.79  As the 
expedition coasted along the Outer Banks, Fernandes nearly grounded the ships on modern Cape 
Lookout.  White’s assessment: “such was the carelessness, and ignorance of our Master.”80 
The expedition anchored at the inlet previously called Port Ferdinando, with White 
careful to remove the pilot’s name and refer to it only as “Hatoraske.”81  Intending to visit 
Grenville’s holding party on Roanoke and “have conference, concerning the state of the 
Countrey, and Savages,” White took forty of his best men into the pinnace to enter the inlet.  At 
this point, White’s condemnation of Fernandes reaches its climax: 
Assoone as we were put with our pinnesse from the shippe, a Gentleman by the meanes 
of Fernando, who was appointed to returne for England, called to the sailers in the 
pinnesse, charging them not to bring any of the planters backe againe, but leave them in 
the Island, except the Governour, and two or three such as he approoved, saying that the 
Summer was farre spent, wherefore hee would land all the planters in no other place.  
Unto this were all the sailers both in the pinnesse, and shippe, perswaded by the Master, 
wherefore it booted not the Governor to contend with them…82 
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According to White, Fernandes’s piratical urge to reach the Azores and intercept the treasure 
fleet before the summer passed marooned the colony on Roanoke.  As the governor of the 
colony, White offered no resistance to the sailors’ coup and began moving his colonists to the 
island he knew well. 
If White’s accusations are true, they show Fernandes to be guilty of a damnable amount 
of treachery.83  By all appearances, Fernandes intentionally tried to prevent the colony’s success 
by keeping them from necessary provisions.  However, this does not make sense, especially 
since Fernandes made a sizable investment in the expedition and was among the twelve 
assistants.84  More likely, White opposed Fernandes’s attempts to take prizes in the West Indies, 
since no prizes are mentioned, as they are in the narratives of the 1585 colony’s journey through 
the same area.  Perhaps Fernandes’s actions were a childlike act of revenge for frustrating his 
own purposes on the voyage, or perhaps he forced White to decide which places to seek supplies 
in the West Indies.  This could explain their failure to victual and White’s need for a scapegoat.  
White’s account may be largely fabricated to hide his own preference to return to Roanoke 
Island, which he already knew well; in the nascent national rivalries birthed by the Protestant 
Reformation, the foreign Fernandes would have been a believable saboteur in England.  White’s 
account also shows signs of heavy editing after he arrived home late in 1587.  Fernandes is 
clearly the villain of the entire enterprise from the beginning of the journey, and his actions at 
Roanoke are unsurprising when they appear in White’s narrative. 
Regardless of the circumstances, Ralegh’s colony was not in its intended destination as it 
began the arduous task of reoccupying the previous colony’s overgrown buildings.  Roanoke’s 
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hostility to English settlement was abundantly clear: the holding party was gone, only a skeleton 
left behind to suggest their fate; and soon after landing, Indians murdered George Howe as he 
searched the beach for clams.85  Under these hostile conditions, John White left his colony to go 
to England to secure supplies.  In his account, he is careful to emphasize the colonists’ insistence 
that he go instead of anyone else, but the governor’s departure from the colony is bizarre and 
unreasonable without further explanation.86  It serves as a fittingly problematic bookend to his 
conflicted description of the colony’s beginnings.  White boarded a pinnace and sailed alongside 
Fernandes’s Lion, which had remained at Roanoke for several weeks, apparently unconcerned 
with the lateness of the season.  The men did eventually reach the Azores, seeking prizes 
unsuccessfully before returning to England.87  In the meantime, 114 men and women began new 
lives in the New World. 
Ralegh’s reaction to White’s report must have been less than enthusiastic.  Despite their 
long-term working relationship, Simão Fernandes never sailed for Ralegh again.  Ralegh was 
disappointed to find that his colony was in the same hostile territory that defeated his previous 
efforts.  This must have been especially so since Ralegh had more fully embraced anti-Spanish 
piracy in 1587, and Roanoke had already been proven unsuitable for such purposes.  He did 
arrange for Sir Richard Grenville to lead a large relief expedition to sail with supplies shortly 
after White’s return, but the Privy Council halted his plan in the interest of preserving all 
resources for the war effort against Spain.88  Nevertheless, White sailed with the small Brave and 
Roe in April 1588.  The crew were chiefly interested in plunder from the outset, only to be 
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subdued by a French pirate and sent limping back to England.89  Some privateers ventured to the 
West Indies and the Grand Banks of Newfoundland in 1588 and 1589, but there is no evidence 
that they visited Ralegh’s colony.  In 1590, White finally sailed with three of John Watts’s 
privateering ships to ascertain the status of his colony.  After a hazardous journey, White found 
the enigmatic word “CROATOAN” carved in the palisade around the settlement site on Roanoke 
Island.90  Before further searches could be made on Croatoan Island, strong storms raked the 
Outer Banks, and White’s shipmates determined to abandon the search and make for the West 
Indies to find plunder.           
Many forces seemed to conspire against the Roanoke Colony, and Ralegh himself cannot 
escape the blame for their disappearance.  Instead of energetically securing the colony’s relief, 
Ralegh diverted his attention to his increasing investments in piracy and his commitments in 
Ireland.  In the hysteria abroad in England during the Armada’s preparation, Ralegh 
understandably focused his efforts on securing his massive land holdings in southwestern 
Ireland.  The remote coast was a likely place for an amphibious landing of Spanish troops, who 
could use the solidly Catholic and reliably anti-English native Irish as hosts for their preparations 
to invade England itself.  But even after the Spanish threat of invasion diminished in 1589, he 
went to Munster to personally fight his battles against the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Sir William 
Fitzwilliam.91  Roanoke was a distant concern in comparison to his immediate needs closer to 
home; nevertheless, Ralegh did induce a group of nineteen gentlemen to join him in 
responsibility for “the inhabiting, and planting of our people in Virginia” early in 1589.92  While 
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Ralegh ultimately remained in charge of the venture, the message of this new arrangement was 
clear: his resources were being stretched by his involvement in America, and he wanted others to 
share in the responsibility for finding his colony, unseen for nearly three years.  White’s voyage 
with the Watts syndicate yielded nothing of sufficient interest for Ralegh to dedicate more effort 
to finding his colony.  Furthermore, Ralegh’s patent expired on March 24, 1591, if no permanent 
settlement had been made under its provisions; the mystery surrounding Roanoke’s fate was 
more valuable to Ralegh in the 1590s than secure proof that they had been defeated by the hostile 
American environment.93 
New theories on the eventual fate of the Lost Colonists have been regularly floated since 
their disappearance in the sixteenth century.  In the twentieth century, scholars largely came to 
accept David Beers Quinn’s belief that the colony relocated to their intended destination on the 
Chesapeake Bay.  Jamestown’s settlers searched for the colonists after their arrival in 1607, and 
their accounts provide tantalizing clues about the colonists’ persistence over twenty years after 
their abandonment.  Quinn believed that Powhatan, the mighty chief who encountered the 
English at Jamestown, massacred the colonists, as the chief bragged to John Smith in 1608.94  
Quinn’s theory has received criticism in recent years, especially with the publication of Lee 
Miller’s Roanoke: Solving the Mystery of the Lost Colony in 2000.  Miller argued that the 
colonists simply relocated “fifty miles into the main” as they had originally planned with John 
White before his departure.95  Miller uses further evidence from Jamestown’s settlers suggesting 
that the English were enslaved by the Indians of the interior and used to “beat copper” for their 
Indian masters.96  Despite no shortage of attempts to explain the fate of the colonists, until 
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archaeological work proves otherwise, they remain in the twenty-first century as they were to 
John White in 1590: lost.         
 The Roanoke expeditions highlight the theoretical divisions between the prominent 
colonial promoters of the Elizabethan Era.  Competing conceptions of the necessary orientation 
of successful colonies pushed and pulled against one another in those uncertain times.  Powerful 
men differed strongly on whether these settlements should be primarily agricultural, piratical, 
militaristic, religious, or some amalgamation of these orientations.  Ultimately, the climate of 
state-sponsored piracy in the 1580s and 1590s affected Roanoke most profoundly.  It guaranteed 
that the ships’ crews responsible for the colonists’ safe passages would be motivated by the 
possibility of plunder rather than the future hopes of tenuous settlements on the American coast.  
Simão Fernandes played his final, anti-climactic role in English colonization in 1587 when he 
disobeyed Ralegh’s instructions and dumped the colony at Roanoke Island, but he can hardly be 
blamed solely for the failures of the experiment.  Piracy created a positive feedback loop as long-
term piracy at sea precipitated war with Spain, dooming the colonists who risked their lives in 
America to help maintain the piratical enterprise.  In the end, Roanoke’s sustaining lure for the 
English proved to be its undoing.         
 
Epilogue: A Reprise for Reprisal 
 The second half of the sixteenth century saw piracy at sea become increasingly 
interwoven with English overseas expeditions.  Lending the period its general character and 
uniting a disparate series of failed attempts to create a permanent English presence in the 
Americas, piracy proved an attractive lure to prospective participants and tragically undercut the 
slim possibility of success in many ventures.  Piracy came to be closely associated with colonial 
settlement through a process largely begun by Gilbert, a man not immediately associable with 
piracy, and culminating in Ralegh’s Roanoke enterprises at the outset of the Anglo-Spanish War.  
Pirates operating primarily in their own self-interest promised to fulfill the Crown’s more 
ideological hopes to oppose the Spanish. 
John White’s failure to locate the Roanoke Colony in 1590 signaled a major pause in the 
flurry of English colonial activity focused on North America that began in the early 1570s.  The 
sea war between England and Spain dominated the attention of the state and its most eminent 
individuals in the 1590s.  The lucrative haul of the many English privateers operating throughout 
the Atlantic World from the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish War in 1585 until the formal end of 
the conflict in 1604 proved that the insistent demands of many promoters on the necessity of an 
American piracy base were largely unnecessary.  From their bases of operation in the West 
Country of England and the southern coast of Ireland, Elizabeth’s sea dogs did considerable 
damage to Spanish shipping, but never came close to unraveling the Spanish imperial machine as 
Gilbert and some of his associates thought possible.   
 The ascension of James VI of Scotland to the English throne upon the childless 
Elizabeth’s death in 1603 brought major change to England’s foreign policy positions, especially 
with Spain.  The newly minted King James I of England and Ireland sought a new era of peace 
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with the Spanish and chose to make an example of Sir Walter Ralegh who still hoped to settle 
scores with the Catholic rival.  Ralegh’s blunders in Guyana, especially those piracies committed 
against the Spanish in 1617, coupled with his thinly veiled disdain for the new king, led to a 
charge of treason and his execution in 1618.1  He played no role in the renewed effort to settle 
Virginia under the Virginia Company in 1606.  Indeed, the Elizabethan generation largely 
departed from the stage by the time England first established a permanent presence in the 
Americas: Gilbert, Grenville, Lane, Ralegh, Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, Fernandes, and nearly 
all other major participants in the enterprises under Elizabeth were dead and played no active 
role in the formation of Jamestown.  Only Richard Hakluyt, the publicist of all the 
aforementioned, had his name listed among the investors in the Virginia Company.2  An age had 
come and gone. 
 Nevertheless, some elements of the sixteenth century’s culture of piratical colonization 
did not die with the participants.  Puritans in England during the Stuart monarchy would have fit 
well in the passionately anti-Spanish environment of the sea dogs.  Chafing under James I’s 
pacifistic orientation toward the Catholic Spanish, English puritans looked for opportunities to 
build a more authentic Christian society outside England.  These militant Protestants are best 
known for their successful colonial refuges in New England – the Norumbega of Gilbert’s 
generation – but Puritans also settled Providence Island near the coast of modern Nicaragua in 
1629.  Nestled deep in the Caribbean Sea along the Spanish Main, Providence’s promoters, like 
the notorious pirate magnate Robert Rich, the Second Earl of Warwick, hoped for their island 
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colony to serve as a thorn in the Spanish side.  This Puritan colony differed greatly from the 
more long-lasting settlements in North America with its slave labor system, tropical agricultural 
aims, and its incorporation of piracy into its stated mission.  The colony did not last, however, 
and suffered Spanish destruction much as the French Huguenot settlements in La Florida had in 
the 1560s.3 
 Ireland continued to frustrate succeeding English monarchs throughout the seventeenth 
century, but Elizabeth’s sustained effort toward pacification of the island had brought most of 
Ireland under her heel by her death in 1603.  The Munster and Ulster plantations, along with 
Dublin, served as the centers from which English control of the island emanated.  John White 
lived his last years on the island, and Thomas Hariot and Walter Ralegh spent considerable time 
there in the early years of the seventeenth century.  Indeed, after Roanoke’s failure, Ralegh 
focused most of his energy on his lucrative lands in the Munster Plantation.  General English 
control, however, did not signal an end to barbaric violence throughout Ireland.  The seventeenth 
century was likely the island’s bloodiest, with large Protestant populations of settlers from 
England and Scotland holding power over the much more numerous Catholic natives.  Puritan 
ascendancy under Cromwell signaled further trouble for the majority of the Irish, and they 
suffered under a yoke similarly dreadful to that experienced by the host of Native Americans that 
faced English conquest in the century.  As under Elizabeth, the Irish experience continued to 
shape English engagement with America, and as England established settlements on the fringes 
of North America, those experiences also came to inform the Irish enterprise.   
 Sir Humphrey Gilbert failed miserably in his efforts to establish a permanent English 
presence in the New World, but his anti-Spanish agenda embodied in his original plans to “annoy 
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the king of Spayne” became fashionable again long after his death at sea in 1583.  In 1625, Sir 
John Coke suggested a remarkably similar plan to seize one of the major islands in the West 
Indies for the purpose of continuing the assault on the Spanish Main.4  Several such plans 
circulated through Parliament in the mid-1620s without implementation, but when the Puritans 
gained power after English Civil War, Cromwell moved with open aggression against the 
Spanish in the West Indies.  His Western Design failed in its goal to take Hispaniola, but it did 
succeed in taking Jamaica, a backwater island neglected by the Spanish that became a jewel 
among English possessions with the ascendance of sugar.  While John C. Appleby claims that 
Coke’s plan represented the “real ‘germs of the West Indian policy of the Protectorate,’” and 
Carla Pestana avoids comparing Cromwell’s efforts to those of the Elizabethans since 
“presenting the Design as backward-looking renders it inconsequential,” the Elizabethan 
proponents of overseas colonies first articulated such plans.5  Historians have ignored them 
generally, and Gilbert most particularly, in their consideration of later developments.  Perhaps 
the fact that no permanent English settlements emerged in the sixteenth century explains their 
willingness to neglect the precedents that Gilbert and his ilk established.  Ironically, considering 
Cromwell’s crusade to the Caribbean without due consideration for the precedents that informed 
it renders the earliest era of English expansion into the Atlantic as inconsequential as Pestana 
fears that the Western Design has become in the historiography.   
 Despite the lasting influence of the Elizabethan promoters, the colonial environment had 
fundamentally changed.  Successful English colonies never coupled state-sanctioned plunder 
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with the colonial effort, as the efforts under Gilbert and Ralegh did.  Barely-restrained piracy 
served as a powerful motivating force for the participants in the earliest colonies, but it created 
instability that continually sabotaged the effort.  A successful colony in the seventeenth century 
never employed plunder so closely with its explicit mission.  After initial failures, Gilbert and 
Ralegh actually understood that land and agricultural commodities held the hope for success in 
North America, a remarkable adjustment to their initial schemes that would have to be relearned 
by their successors; however, the climate of piracy prevalent in the late sixteenth century, and 
encouraged by the brothers, still hampered their second efforts.  Their actions helped initiate an 
English colonialism that would be perceived as generally piratical to the colonized peoples of the 
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